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ABSTRACT 
 Current U.S. strategy describes a world of great power competition, where China 
and Russia are named U.S. competitors. In Africa, a narrative of U.S. competitors gaining 
influence in a region of growing strategic significance has emerged. The extent to which 
U.S. competitors realize influence over targeted African states and the roots of one state’s 
influence over another, however, remains under analyzed, revealing gaps within the 
broader literature. This research seeks to address these gaps, by asking how and to what 
extent Chinese and Russian activities succeed in furthering their influence in Africa and 
what are the implications for U.S. policy within the region? To address these questions, 
this thesis applies a framework emphasizing the power mechanisms of international 
influence to study Chinese and Russian activities in two pivotal states in Africa: Kenya 
and South Africa. Broadly speaking, this research found foreign influence to be much 
more nuanced than what common narratives suggest. Specifically, the findings show that 
democratic institutions in the two countries often blunt U.S. competitor influence, 
suggesting the importance of U.S. foreign policy toward assisting its African partners in 
advancing democratic institutions. Improving the political structures of its African 
partners, this research suggests, will better serve the United States. 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Africa has attracted the interests of foreign powers throughout its history. The late 
nineteenth century saw European powers seeking to consolidate their own spheres of 
influence on the continent in what came to be known as the “Scramble for Africa.” Today 
authors, such as Pádraig Carmody, see a similar struggle taking shape between the U.S. 
and its competitors.1 Observers of African geopolitics have taken notice to the increasing 
levels of Russian and Chinese engagement with African nations.2 This research examines 
the contours of great power competition between the U.S. and its competitors, namely 
Russia and China, within the African context.  
Potential threats posed by Russia and China have increasingly attracted U.S. 
attention. U.S. strategy describes a world of great power competition with China and 
Russia as the named U.S. strategic competitors. As a result, researchers have conducted a 
wealth of analysis regarding the behavior of Russia and China. This body of knowledge 
has left gaps about the extent to which these U.S. competitors realize influence over 
targeted African states and the root causes for one state to have influence over another. 
This research seeks to address these gaps. Specifically, this research asks, How and to 
what extent do Chinese and Russian activities succeed in furthering their influence in 
Africa? And what are the implications for U.S. policy within the region? 
This thesis finds that foreign influence in African countries appears more nuanced 
and limited than what other narratives would suggest. A key finding in this literature was 
the limiting factor of foreign influence due to the political landscape of the target state. In 
short, societies who maintain politically conscious civil societies, institutional checks on 
executive decisions, and a relatively free media environment, tend to limit the ambitions 
of foreign powers seeking to exert influence over another.  
 
1 Pádraig Carmody, The New Scramble for Africa (New Jersey: Wiley, 2011), 9. 
2 Ibid 
2 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH QUESTION 
Africa is of strategic concern for the U.S. and its allies. Diplomatically, nearly one 
third of the U.N. General Assembly is comprised of African states, making Africa a 
potentially large political bloc. Demographically, current U.N. projections predict that 40% 
of the world’s population will consist of African peoples by the end of the century.3 
Economically, six of the ten fastest growing economies in the world are African countries.4 
Because of these factors, the African continent offers the U.S. and its competitors both 
current and future strategic opportunities. Understanding the influence U.S. competitors 
achieve through their engagements with African nations plays a critical role in assessing 
U.S. foreign policy within the region. This is especially true when considering current U.S. 
foreign policy aims to compete with Russia and China in the region, by strengthening its 
partnership with African states.  
Recent updates to the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense 
Strategy (NDS) recognize Africa’s strategic value and the importance of competing with 
Russia and China within the region. Echoing the NSS and NDS, former President Trump’s 
own Africa Strategy placed competition with Russia and China at the heart of his sub-
Saharan Africa policy. Unsurprisingly, U.S. military commanders have aligned their 
priorities with Washington’s. General Townsend, testifying before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee in April 2019, claimed that Africa offers America a competitive edge 
over Russian and China, an advantage which should be leveraged in his opinion.5 The 
special emphasis given to Chinese and Russian activities within Africa by top U.S. officials 
makes the significance of this research all the more relevant, as it is directly aligns with 
stated U.S. foreign policy and the priorities of top U.S. officials.  
 
3 Benjamin Elisha Sawe, “In 2100, 40% Of the World Population Will be African,” World Atlas, last 
modified, January 6, 2020, https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/in-2100-40-of-the-world-population-will-
be-african.html 
4“Global Issues Population,” United Nations, last modified July 11, 2020, 
https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/population/index.html 
5 U.S. Africa Command Public Affairs, “U.S. Africa Command Testimony to Senate Armed Services 
Committee,” AFRICOM, last modified April 21,2021, https://www.africom.mil/pressrelease/33693/us-
africa-command-testimony-to-senate-armed-services-committee 
3 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Several perspectives emerge from the literature focusing on Russian and Chinese 
influence in Africa. In general, scholars tend to see Russian activities in Africa as having 
limited influence. By contrast, much of the scholarship on China in Africa sees China’s 
many activities and large-scale investments as generating the potential for significant 
influence in African countries, with some noting the limits.  
Before addressing these perspectives, it is necessary to define what it means for a 
country to have influence over another. The literature talks extensively of influence, yet 
often fails to define it. Political science scholars offer their own definition of influence. In 
one prominent definition, Robert Dahl describes influence as, “a relation among human 
actors such that the wants, desires, preferences, or intentions of one or more actors affect 
the actions, or predispositions to act, of one or more other actors in a direction consistent 
with—and not contrary to—the wants, preferences, or intentions of the influence-
wielders.” This research adopts Dahl’s description of influence towards its own assessment 
of Russia and China in Africa. Although much of the literature fails to define the term and 
tends to assume certain actions lead to influence, the literature is rich with case studies 
focusing on the influence of U.S. competitors with African states.  
1. Russian Influence  
Russia’s intransigent behavior in the international arena, culminating with its 
annexation of Crimea in 2014, has given the Kremlin’s engagement with African states 
special scrutiny. Western media tends to characterize Russia’s engagement with African 
governments as disruptive and undermining to the regional objectives of Western countries 
and their African partners. This narrative often sees Russia gaining influence through 
nefarious commercial arrangements and military support to authoritarian African regimes. 
Some in the academic community echo this perspective; however, more characterize 
Russia’s engagement as achieving limited influence over target states.   
4 
a. The Dominant Perspective: Limited Russian Influence 
The dominant perspective from the literature suggests the limited nature of Russian 
influence. Kimberly Marten acknowledges the increasing level of Russian activity in 
Africa, but argues the Kremlin’s influence within the region remains limited.6 One limiting 
factor to Russian influence, she argues, is the longstanding presence of the United States 
(US), the European Union (EU), China’s commercial and financial activities, and the 
growing interest of other states.7 Emmanuel Dreyfus makes a claim similar to Marten’s, 
arguing that Russia comparatively lacks the economic attractiveness characteristic of 
China, the EU, or the U.S. and will struggle to gain a meaningful foothold in Africa.8 
Additionally, Dreyfus argues that Russia’s influence activities within the region, such as 
the military cooperation agreements signed between Russia and African governments, are 
likely unsustainable because of Russia’s own domestic challenges and the low priority 
Africa holds in Russia’s foreign policy agenda.9 These perspectives suggest there are a 
variety of reasons why Russia’s influence is likely to be limited in Africa. 
It appears the key factor limiting Russian influence in Africa is the fact that Russia 
has little to offer African governments relative to other foreign powers. Dylan Yachyshen 
argues that despite the increased Russian commercial activity on the continent, Russia has 
little to offer African states outside of military capabilities. Even as a provider of military 
capabilities, Yachyshen claims Russian influence remains limited. When South Africa, one 
of the largest African recipients of Russian military equipment, rejected of a civil nuclear 
deal signed between the Kremlin and former President Jacob Zuma, Yachyshen saw this 
as a sign of Russia’s limited influence.10 Even when it comes to improving their military 
 
6 Kimberly Marten, “Russia’s Back in Africa: Is the Cold War Returning?” The Washington 
Quarterly, last modified December 2019, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2019.1693105 
7 Ibid.  
8 Emmanuel Dreyfus, “Moscow’s Limited Prospects in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Kennan Cable. February 
2020. Wilson Centery. Washington, DC. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennan-cable-no-47-
moscows-limited-prospects-sub-saharan-africa 
9 Dreyfus, “Moscow’s Limited Prospects in Sub-Saharan Africa.”  




capabilities, Yachyshen argues that various African states would prefer to work in 
partnership with the U.S., but since the opportunity is not there, Russia supplies this need.11  
A key component to Russia’s increasing activity in Africa appears to be linked to 
Western sanctions rather than efforts by the Kremlin to gain influence. Yachyshen 
dismisses the idea that Russian energy agreements perform as mechanisms for Russian 
influence over African states. Instead, he argues Western sanctions levied on Russia 
following its annexation of Crimea in 2014 forced Russian firms to seek markets 
unconstrained by these sanctions. Additionally, he sees Russia’s military cooperation 
agreements with African regimes as mechanisms to facilitate Russian energy firms’— such 
as Gazprom, Rosneft, and Lukoil—operations in Africa.12 Arnaud Kalika, sees the 
interests of these domestic firms as counterproductive to the Kremlin’s influence over 
African governments. Kalika argues that these firms need access to African markets more 
than African governments need Russian commercial activity.13 Kalika characterizes 
Russia as an ‘economic lightweight’ in the region that is seeking to build inroads with 
likeminded authoritarian regimes, who provide the Kremlin’s domestic firms with markets 
unconstrained by Western sanctions.14 Both Yachyshen and Kalika argue that once 
Western sanctions began to impact Russian domestic firms, Russian energy deals and 
military cooperation agreements appeared in Africa.  
Russia’s military cooperation agreements with African governments typically 
manifest themselves in the form of arms sales, private military companies (PMCs), and 
military advisors.15 Arms sales, Paul Stronski explains, provide the Kremlin’s best 
resource towards gaining influence in Africa because such activities, “make it possible to 
 
11 Yachyshen. “Great Power Competition and the Scramble for Africa.” 
12 Ibid. 
13 Kalika, Arnaud. Russia’s ‘Great Return’ to Africa? Paris, France: INFRI, No. 114. 2019. Pp.4 
https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/russieneivisions/russias-great-return-africa  
14 Arnaud, Russia’s ‘Great Return’ to Africa? 
15 Steve Balestieri. “Russian Military Expands in Africa by Building Bases in Six Countries,” last 
modified August 2020, https://sofrep.com/news/russian-military-expands-in-africa-by-building-bases-in-
six-countries/ 
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establish and sustain long-term relationships with African military and political leaders.”16 
Russian PMCs and military advisors operating on the African continent have been viewed 
by many, especially in the Western media, as indicators of growing Russian influence 
within the region. Stronski argues differently. He sees these activities as symptoms of 
Russia’s limited capacity to deploy its uniformed personnel abroad and that Russia uses 
such activities to cheaply broadcast the perception that it shares the same global relevance 
as its predecessor the Soviet Union.17 
Russian officials often evoke a positive narrative when describing the historical 
legacy of the Soviet Union in Africa, suggesting that this legacy may provide inroads for 
renewed relations.18 Stronski, while acknowledging the support the Soviet Union provided 
to many African independence movements, challenges the premise that such a legacy 
attracts any meaningful influence for the current Russian Federation. Stronski argues the 
present-day Russia lacks the economic ‘deep pockets’ and the ideological influence of its 
predecessor.19 Taking a position similar to Stronski’s, Arnaud Kalika expresses doubts that 
Russia’s ‘Great Return’ to Africa, combined with the legacy of the Soviet Union, furthers 
the Kremlin’s influence within the region. Kalika further points out that African 
governments disapprovingly remember how quickly Russian diplomats left Africa once 
the Soviet Union began to unravel.20  
The dominant themes emerging from the above literature characterize the limited 
influence Russia maintains over African states. Blocked by Western sanctions, Russia’s 
commercial interests, seeking new markets and resources, appear to be largely responsible 
for driving the Kremlin’s return to Africa. This need for commercial opportunities, the 
 
16 Paul Stronski. “Late to the Party: Russia’s Return to Africa.” Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, October 2019. https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/16/late-to-party-russia-s-return-to-africa-
pub-80056 
17 Balestieri. “Russian Military Expands in Africa by Building Bases in Six Countries.” 
18 Reid Standish. “Putin Has a Dream of Africa.” Foreign Policy. October 2019. 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/25/russia-africa-development-soviet-union/ 
19 Paul Stronski. “Late to the Party: Russia’s Return to Africa.” Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, October 2019. https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/16/late-to-party-russia-s-return-to-africa-
pub-80056 
20 Kalika, Russia’s ‘Great Return’ to Africa?  
7 
literature suggests, places African governments in a position to potentially exert their own 
influence over the Kremlin. 
b. Possible Sources of Russian Influence in Africa 
As previously mentioned, Russia’s military support to African regimes has become 
fundamental to its foreign policy within the region, and offers one potential avenue for 
influence. In Grzegorz Kuczyński’s perspective, Russia’s military support to African 
countries and its use of mercenaries encompass the Kremlin’s most effective mechanisms 
to gain influence.21 Kuczyński sees the military cooperation agreements the Kremlin 
signed with African nations since 2018 as indication of Russia’s relevance as a provider of 
military capabilities to African governments. Russian military equipment maintains a 
reputation among African militaries as being reliable, cheap, easy to maintain and operate, 
making Russian military equipment in high demand on the continent. Kuczyński argues 
that the provision of military hardware gives Russia influence by establishing long-term 
relationships with African military and political leaders.22 In his eyes, Russia’s only 
comparative advantage in gaining influence in Africa is through this military support, 
which has been welcomed by many African governments. Christian Malanga, an 
opposition politician in the Democratic Republic of Congo, admitted that “China is the 
money and Russia is the Muscle.”23  
Russia’s military cooperation agreements often attract certain types of regimes, 
suggesting that Russian influence could take hold in some countries. The military support 
Russia offers African governments, according to Kyle Strambland, comes with fewer 
strings attached when compared to Chinese and U.S. agreements. Strambland claims this 
strategy is used by the Kremlin to gain influence over Africa rulers, especially those in 
 
21 Grzegorz Kuczyński, Russia in Africa: Weapons, Mercenaries, Spin Doctors Warsaw, Poland: 
Warsaw Insittute, 2019. https://warsawinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Russia-in-Africa-
weapons-mercenaries-spin-doctors-Warsaw-Institute-Report.pdf  
22 Kuczyński, Russia in Africa: Weapons, Mercenaries, Spin Doctors.  
23 Ibid.  
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opposition to initiatives supported by the U.S. and the EU.24 Many African governments 
resent these Western pressures and Strambland sees Russia as exploiting this resentment 
in order to align African regimes with the anti-Western position of the Kremlin. Strambland 
admits that Russian influence is nowhere near the scale of China or the U.S. Despite this, 
he claims Russia has been successful in gaining influence through the military support it 
provides African regimes.25  
2. Chinese Influence 
Much of the literature focuses on the large-scale characterizing China’s recent 
engagement with Africa. It is this seemingly massive scale of Chinese engagement with 
African countries that many authors associate with Beijing’s increasing influence in the 
region. However, while these authors demonstrate the scope and scale of China’s activities, 
they often fail to demonstrate how such activities lead to Chinese influence. Other authors, 
acknowledging the magnitude of Chinese engagement in Africa, argue that such activities 
achieve limited, if any, influence over African states.  
a. Chinese History and Motivations in Africa 
Chinese interest and engagement with African countries is hardly new. The Chinese 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) helped train the Former Liberation Movements of 
Southern Africa (FLMSA), along with other independence movements, during their 
liberation struggles.26 Many African leaders attribute the success of their liberation 
movements to the Chinese models and doctrine they adopted. On his visit to Hunan, the 
birthplace of Mao Zedong, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni is quoted as saying, 
“Revolutionaries come to Hunan like Catholics go to Rome.”27 China leverages its 
historical legacy in Africa in an effort to perpetuate the image of a benevolent partner to 
 
24 Kyle Stramblad, “The 21st Century Scramble for Africa,” Over the Horizon, last modified 
November 27, 2019. https://othjournal.com/2019/11/27/the-21st-century-scramble-for-africa/ 
25 Stramblad. “The 21st Century Scramble for Africa.”  
26 Paul Nantulya. “China Promotes Its Party-Army Model in Africa.” July 28, 2020. 
https://africacenter.org/spotlight/china-promotes-its-party-army-model-in-africa/ 
27 Ibid.  
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African nations. Unlike many Western powers, China does not have an imperial legacy in 
Africa, avoided an assertive African policy during the Cold War, and supported several 
African countries in their struggles for independence. This historical narrative, as 
previously illustrated by President Museveni’s quote, potentially builds friendly 
partnerships between Beijing and African leaders, enhancing China’s influence in the 
process. These partnerships are becoming increasingly important for China’s own growth. 
China’s rapid development and modernization continues to stress the limits of its 
own domestic resources. By 2025, more than 520 million Chinese people will be 
considered upper-middle class, which will further stress China’s domestic resources to 
meet the demands of its domestic market.28 With this in mind, it is easy to see why China 
is attracted to Africa. African countries are rich in natural resources and their booming 
populations makes Africa a growing market for Chinese exports. Lastly, as a political 
voting bloc, nearly a third of the UN General Assembly is comprised of African nations, 
making the region all the more relevant from a geopolitical standpoint. Beijing’s interest 
in Africa has made China Africa’s largest economic and development partner.29  
b. Chinese Activities and Influence in Africa 
Economically, Africa is a rich source in natural materials and market opportunities 
for foreign powers. Understanding this, China has engaged heavily in infrastructure 
development, financial aid and loans to African states. A large driver to this engagement 
is China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative, credited with large infrastructure projects 
throughout Africa. Some authors, such as Robert Blackwill and Jennifer Harris, claim that 
such activities are intended to bolster China’s influence over African states through 
material rewards, a method sometimes referred to as ‘stadium diplomacy’.30 Others, such 
as Paul Nantulya, claim China’s economic activities are methods to positively influence 
 
28 Tiboris, Michael. “Addressing China’s Rising Influence in Africa.” The Chicago Council on Global 
Affairs. May 2019. https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/report_addressing-chinas-rising-
influence-africa_20190521.pdf 
29 Brigety, Reuben. “A Post-American Africa: The U.S. Is Falling Behind.” Foreign Affairs. August 
2018. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2018-08-28/post-american-africa 
30 Blackwill, Robert, and Jennifer Harris. War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016.  
10 
the attitudes African states have towards the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), by 
portraying China as a benevolent superpower seeking to assist African states in their own 
economic prosperity.31 No matter what the motivations, it is clear that China is engaging 
in a range of activities that may—or may not—bring about greater influence in African 
countries. 
China’s military engagements are more limited than its economic engagements, but 
its importance and influence may be growing. Paul Nantulya addresses the military 
component to China’s engagement with African militaries. He highlights the increase of 
African military officers attending Chinese Professional Military Education engagements. 
In his account, 60% of foreign officers attending Chinese military institutions are from 
African countries, and these institutions tend to emphasize the importance of military 
loyalty to the ruling party of the state.32 Zimbabwe, South Sudan, Angola, Mozambique, 
and Uganda have incorporated similar political-military structures in their own militaries. 
Nantulya views these activities as China’s effort to attract African governments to the CCP 
in order to further its influence on the continent.33 Despite Nantulya’s observation, few 
examples from the literature link Chinese military activities with Chinese influence in 
Africa.  
The Chinese diaspora currently residing in Africa is another potential avenue of 
influence for Beijing. China presently has an estimated 1 million migrants living in Africa, 
largely working on behalf of Chinese. A Chinese diaspora in Africa, Howard French 
claims, offers the Chinese government the greatest potential to further its economic and 
political influence across the continent.34 Drawing parallels from Portuguese and Japanese 
empire building in Africa and Manchuria respectively, French argues China is showing a 
similar pattern of empire through emigration in Africa.35 French does not claim Beijing is 
 
31 Paul Natulya. “Grand Strategy and China’s Soft Power Push in Africa.” August 30, 2018. 
https://africacenter.org/spotlight/grand-strategy-and-chinas-soft-power-push-in-africa/ 





purposefully pursuing building an empire in Africa through such means; however, his 
observations lead him to conclude that such an outcome is taking shape.  
On the surface, it appears the scale of China’s engagement with African countries 
brings influence to Beijing. However, the more one analyzes this claim, the more scrutiny 
it attracts. The literature does not dispute the unprecedented level of Chinese engagement 
across Africa. Where the literature diverges is to what extent these efforts achieve influence 
over African states. Some argue China’s economic, commercial, and financial engagement 
with African states gives it multiple avenues for furthering its own influence within the 
region. Others, acknowledging the level of China’s involvement in Africa’s development, 
see that China has yet to demonstrate it has achieved such influence over its African 
partners.  
Despite the expanding array of Chinese engagements in Africa, there remains some 
question as to whether China succeeds in expanding its influence. Yung Sun sees China’s 
Africa Policy as encountering more challenges than influence. Specifically, she depicts its 
mercantilist policy over Sino-African relations as detrimental to Beijing’s reputation with 
its African partners.36 Yun Sun highlights that China’s engagement with African states is 
complex and that despite its unprecedented economic and financial engagement with 
African countries, Chinese influence remains unguaranteed. Like Sun, Elizabeth Economy 
contends that the scale of China’s financial activities fails to translate into influence over 
African states. She claims that were China to repeat the kind of ‘debt trap diplomacy’ it 
demonstrated in Sri Lanka and Pakistan, it would likely encounter African governments 
less conciliatory to Chinese demands.37 These perspectives cast doubt on whether China’s 
model of economic engagement is actually advancing its influence. 
With regards to Chinese lending practices as a source of influence, Chris Alden and 
Lu Jiang argue that China’s two decades of debt-financed infrastructure development has 
 
36 Yun Sun, Africa in China’s Foreign Policy, Washington, D.C. Brookings. 
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not necessarily increased its influence in Africa.38 Instead, it has exposed Beijing to 
disquieting proportions of African debt that will likely trigger a change in China’s Africa 
policy. Rather than achieving influence from so called ‘debt trap diplomacy’, these authors 
see China’s activities in Africa as forcing Beijing to change its overall approach to the 
continent. Specifically, they argue the Chinese government seems intent on limiting further 
exposure to African sovereign debt.39 Simply put, Alden and Jiang argue that China’s 
massive financial projects in Africa has become a liability to Beijing rather than 
mechanisms for gaining influence.  
In summary, the literature stresses the limited influence of Russia and the potential 
for Chinese influence in Africa. Although Russia is characterized as the more disruptive 
power, its impact tends to be focused and limited. In contrast, China’s foreign policy in 
Africa is more broadly focused and impactful. Although contemporary media hype tends 
to take a skeptical look towards Sino-African relations, scholarly work on the matter is 
hesitant to jump to conclusions.   
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Much of the framework for this research draws from the work of Meierding and 
Sigman.40 They describe the power resources an influencing state uses to engage in 
influence activities. They define these power resources as a state’s material and ideational 
assets, including its military capabilities, economic wealth, and cultural output. Influence 
activities they define as the military, economic, diplomatic, and popular actions that can 
enhance a state’s influence.41 Moreover, they suggest that different types of influence 
activities may engage different types of power mechanisms, which produce the desired 
behavioral changes. They find that mechanisms of expertise, attraction, and legitimacy are 
important for building long-term influence. This research applies Meierding and Sigman’s 
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framework to understand Russian and Chinese influence within two countries—Kenya and 
South Africa. Equipped with this framework, this research analyzes the most prevalent 
power resources mobilized by Russia and China and the influence activates these countries 
undertake in Kenya and South Africa. However, conducting an in-depth analysis of each 
category of influence activities—military, economic, diplomatic, and popular—was 
beyond the scope of this research. Thus, this research focuses on those influence activities 
most likely to generate influence in Kenya and South Africa.  
Influence is a widely discussed topic among international relations (IR) scholars, 
yet the concept remains difficult to measure and assess. Attributing the casual mechanism 
for a state’s behavior is a difficult process and often becomes the genesis of perpetual 
debate among IR scholars. Acknowledging these challenges, Meierding and Sigman 
propose a method for evaluating influence by examining changes in target states behavior, 
examining the power mechanisms mobilized by influence activities, as well as the leverage, 
admiration, and goodwill they generate in the target state.42 This research adopts this 
model in its own assessment of U.S. competitor influence in Kenya and South Africa.  
The model describes six mechanisms through which how one state’s activities can 
generate influence in another state. The reward and coercion mechanism provide the target 
with something positive or by shielding it from something negative. Through the expertise 
mechanism, the influencer knowledge or skills shifts the target’s behavior. In the 
legitimacy mechanism, the target views the influencer as a valid authority figure and aligns 
itself with the influencer’s preferred behavior. In the attraction power mechanism, the 
target identifies with the influencer or desires that sense of identification. Lastly, the 
recognition mechanisms entails the influencer activity identifies the target in a favorable 
way. These mechanisms—reward, coercion, expertise, legitimacy, attraction, and 
recognition—form the lens, through which this research approaches its analysis of state 
influence.  
This research applies this model to Russian and Chinese attempts to cultivate 
influence, with Kenya and South Africa serving as the targeted states. Both Kenya and 
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South Africa are considered strategic partners by the U.S. and both play important roles in 
Africa. As the most developed economy in sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa is the U.S. 
number one trading partner in Africa with approximately six hundred U.S. owned 
businesses operating in the country.43 South Africa is a member of BRICS, Southern 
African Development Community (SADC), and is a key partner in the Organization for the 
Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Enhanced Engagement program. In 
short, South Africa plays a key economic and political role in Africa.  
Of similar importance, Kenya serves as an economic, financial, and transportation 
hub for East Africa. With 80% of East African trade flowing through Mombasa Port, Kenya 
plays a critical role in the East African Community.44 In July 2020, the U.S. and Kenya 
engaged in bilateral negotiations with the goal of establishing a bilateral free trade 
agreement between the two countries. The U.S. maintains longstanding security interests 
with Kenya as well. The U.S. stated security cooperation objectives seek to improve the 
professionalism of the Kenyan military, increase its maritime security awareness, and 
improve its counterterrorism and peacekeeping capabilities.45 Ultimately, Kenya and 
South Africa are of importance to U.S. foreign policy and understanding how U.S. 
competitors gain influence among these strategic partners merits concerted analysis.  
This research uses a broad pool of sources to assess whether Russian and Chinese 
activities are generating influence in Kenya and South Africa. Scholarly publications, 
books, government and nongovernment organization reports, theses and dissertations will 
provide the bulk of research material for this research. Popular sources—news and social 
media—will also be leveraged; however, they serve to augment explanations supported 
from more academically credible sources. Given the difficulty of attributing a country’s 
influence to a targeted state’s behavior, a wide variety of scholarly and journalistic works 
will prove necessary in order to support the explanations of this research.  
 
43 United States Department of State. Bureau of African Affairs, “U.S. Relations With South Africa,” 
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E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This rest of the thesis is organized into three chapters. The next two chapters are 
case studies of U.S. competitor influence. These chapters will examine the power 
mechanisms mobilized by China and Russia and the influence, or potential influence, they 
generate. These chapters will focus on the influence activities most likely to generate 
influence in Kenya and South Africa. The final chapter will reflect on the findings, the 
implications for U.S. foreign policy in Kenya and South Africa respectively, and discuss 
future research possibilities.  
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This chapter focuses on Chinese and Russian influence in Kenya, how power 
resources are mobilized, and what power mechanisms, if any, are activated in the process. 
First, this chapter will provide a background to Kenya-China relations and the avenues 
through which it mobilizes power resources in Kenya. This will provide the reader context 
for the follow-on discussion regarding the potential power mechanisms activated through 
China’s activities in Kenya, which focus primarily on large scale infrastructure 
development projects. This research identifies extensive power resources mobilized by 
China in Kenya and determined the existence of high potential for Chinese influence. 
Limiting this influence; however, is Kenya’s political landscape, which prioritizes the rule 
of law and maintains an engaged civil society sensitive to the impacts of Chinese business. 
Next, this chapter will provide a background on Kenya-Russia relations and the 
power resources mobilized through this relationship. Due to the marginal power resources 
mobilized by Russia, this research fails to identify activation of the various power 
mechanisms vis-à-vis Kenya-Russia relations. Although, rhetoric from Russia and Kenya 
leadership indicates the two intend to reshape this relationship into a more meaningful 
partnership. Should this transpire through the activation of Russian power resources, the 
potential for various power mechanisms will prove more relevant. This research assumes 
that, due to the political landscape of Kenya, Russian influence activities will face similar 
challenges encountered by China and the trajectory of Kenya-Russia relations will be 
shaped by this political landscape.  
B. BACKGROUND: KENYA-CHINA RELATIONS  
China has maintained economic ties with Kenya since before Kenya’s 
independence in 1963. Political intrigue between the Maoist regime and the newly 
independent Kenyan government culminated when both declared the other’s chargé 
d’affaires persona non grata in 1967. This diplomatic tension soured the economic ties 
between the two countries, effectively putting them on hold until Chairman Mao and 
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President Jomo Kenyatta both left the political scene in the late 1970s.46 During this era of 
diplomatic hiatus, Kenya sought a capitalistic oriented developmental model, which 
ideologically and economically distanced Kenya from China. Replacing Kenyatta in 1978, 
Daniel Arap Moi sought to reshape the contentious relationship between Beijing and 
Nairobi. President Moi toned down Kenya’s criticism towards China in favor of 
reestablishing friendly ties with Beijing.  
The Moi era saw an increase in top-level Chinese diplomatic delegations to Kenya. 
Between 1980 and 2002, twenty top-level Chinese diplomatic entourages visited Kenya. 
They included Prime Minister Zhao Ziyan (1983), Foreign Minister Wu Xueqtian (1987), 
President Jian Zemin (1996), and Prime Minister Zhu Rongji (2002). These diplomatic 
missions underscored the growing importance of Kenya in China’s foreign policy. The Moi 
era also saw an increase in Kenya’s diplomatic delegations to China. Moi’s state visit to 
China in 1980, put into motion subsequent diplomatic and economic negotiations between 
the two countries, slowly rekindling friendly relations strained during the previous 
presidency.  
Moi’s new approach towards Kenya-China relations brought an economic and 
technological cooperation agreement along with a state-managed trade agreement.47 This 
positive shift between Nairobi and Beijing witnessed the construction of the Moi 
international Sports Center outside of Nairobi, a new teaching hospital at Moi University 
in Eldoret, and the Gambogi-Serem highway.48 China provided interest free loans for all 
these projects, accounting for more than half their total cost, along with assistance in their 
construction. By the time Moi left office in 2002, he had rehabilitated friendly diplomatic 
ties with China, earned the respect of some top party members within the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), and set conditions for a long-term economic partnership with 
China.49 
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Succeeding Moi in January 2003, President Mwai Kibaki instituted broad economic 
reforms, resulting in an economic recovery that sustained an accelerated growth from 2.9% 
GDP increase in 2003 to 7.1% GDP increase in 2007.50 Kenya’s rising economy attracted 
many foreign entities, who saw an opportunity for profit in Kenya’s rising market, China 
among them. It was during this time where opportunities for China to mobilize its power 
mechanisms began to emerge. With China’s economic transformation in the mid-2000s, 
Beijing became more of a relevant partner to the capitalist oriented Kenyan government.51 
Seeing this, President Kibaki used Kenya’s economic growth and the diplomatic 
momentum, achieved by his predecessor, to continue close economic ties with Beijing. 
China during this time continued to view Kenya as an importance economic partner, 
illustrated by a highly successful Chinese trade exhibition in Nairobi, a presidential visit to 
Kenya by Hu Jintao in 2006, followed by larger trade delegations to Nairobi.52 
Additionally, China began increasing its development assistance to Kenya, largely focused 
on agriculture, telecommunications, and transportation infrastructure development. By 
2009, China had become Kenya’s largest trading partner. 
Looking at this history through the lens of influence, it is important to note that 
Africans have come to understand the forces used by outsiders to achieve influence over 
African societies.53 This partially explains Kenya’s initial distrust of Chinese motives 
between 1963 and the early 1980s.54 As a result, China had few opportunities to gain 
influence in Kenya until Kenya’s impressive economic expansion in the mid-2000s, 
occurring in parallel with China’s own economic growth. In 2015, China became Kenya’s 
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largest financier in terms of infrastructure development assistance.55 As Kenya’s chief 
financier, China owns roughly 66% of Kenya’s bilateral debt, the bulk of which funds 
Kenya’s large-scale infrastructure development projects.56 It is these infrastructure 
projects where China’s power resources are most visible, and where the potential for 
influence is more likely.  
Chinese investments in Kenya are largely driven by the economic initiatives of the 
two countries—Kenya Vision 2030 and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Kenya 
Vision 2030, launched in 2006 by President Mwai Kibaki and adopted by current President 
Uhuru Kenyatta, the Kenya Vision 2030 aims to, “transform Kenya into a newly 
industrializing, middle-income country, providing a high quality of life to all its citizens 
by 2030, in a clean and secure environment.”57 China’s BRI is a multi-decade initiative 
that aims to reshape China’s commercial ties and geopolitical significance in the global 
economy.58 Heavily oriented towards infrastructure development, China’s BRI aligns well 
with Kenya Vision 2030 and President Kenyatta’s desire to further Kenya’s role as a 
commercial hub for East Africa. As a result, large scale infrastructure development 
projects, principally financed by China, have emerged.  
Since 2006, Kenya has accumulated over $9.8billion in debt owed to China’s 
Export-Import (EXIM) Bank.59 These Chinese investments are heavily directed towards 
commodities, information technology, food production, and largescale infrastructure 
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projects.60 Such construction projects include powerline installation for the Kenya 
Electricity and Energy Transmission Company, the tallest real estate project in Kenya 
(NSSF shopping mall), deep-water port construction in Lamu, and standard gauge railway 
line spanning the breadth of the country.61 
Three major Chinese backed infrastructure projects—Kenya Standard Gauge 
Railway, Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia-Transport Corridor, and the Thika Highway 
Project—have attracted particular attention from Kenyans and the international 
community. Each is an exhibition China’s extensive power resources mobilized in Kenya 
and the importance Kenya maintains vis-à-vis China’s global ambitions. Ultimately, these 
examples of China’s mobilized power resources can potentially become sources of 
influence for China.  
a. Kenya Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) 
The Kenya SGR project is one of many ambitious infrastructure projects associated 
with China’s BRI. The project aims to reduce transport cost and transit time of both 
passengers and freight of Kenya’s railway by as much as 60%.62 The state-owned China 
Roads and Bridges Corporation (CRBC) won the contract for the project and began 
construction in October 2014. Partly as a result, eighty-five percent of the $4.7 billion 
project was financed by China’s EXIM Bank, while Kenya co-financed the remaining 15 
percent.63 Construction was completed in 2017 and, despite being Kenya’s most expensive 
infrastructure project since its independence, has yet to achieve the level of profitability 
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necessary to cover the railway’s operational costs and associated debts, the first payment 
of which came due in June 2020.64  
b. Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia-Transport Corridor Project 
The Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia-Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor project is a 
multinational infrastructure development project aimed at creating Kenya’s second 
transport corridor. The project includes the construction of roads, railways, pipelines, and 
the expansion of the port of Lamu. The primary goal of the project is to bring to export, 
through the port of Lamu, newly discovered mineral resources within East Africa’s interior. 
The Lamu port is expected to consist of 32 deep water berths, sixteen of which are under 
construction by the CBRC.65 China’s role in LAPSSET could provide China with favored 
access to much needed energy reserves. However, the development of the port of Lamu 
has sparked backlash among the local community, most notably the Save Lamu Project, a 
nongovernmental organization that seeks to ensure the community of Lamu achieves 
sustainable development while preserving its social, cultural, and environmental integrity. 
The Save Lamu project continues to speak out against Chinese business practices in the 
area. 
c. Thika Highway Project 
The Thika Highway project aimed to ease traffic congestion between Nairobi and 
the industrial town of Thika, roughly 50 kilometers away. The CRBC won the Thika 
highway contract and two other major road contracts in Kenya.66 Co-financed between 
China’s EXIM Bank and the African Development Bank, construction began in 2009 and 
was completed in 2012. The Thika Highway project raised concerns among Kenyans, who 
felt regional firms were barred from the contract negotiation process. 
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The above infrastructure development projects are far from a complete list of those 
with Chinese involvement. Although not a comprehensive list, each illustrates the 
characteristics stemming from Chinese business practices in Kenya. Such characteristics, 
whether they are a matter of perception or fact, include large financial assistance, lack of 
transparency, favoritism towards Chinese firms, and a lack of skills transfer from Chinese 
technicians to their Kenyan counterparts. Each project also has the potential to activate 
various power mechanisms, which might enable Chinese influence in Kenya.  
C. POWER MECHANISMS 
Next, I discuss power mechanisms—reward, coercion, expertise, attractiveness, 
legitimacy, and recognition—potentially at work through these infrastructure development 
projects.67 When an influencer state mobilizes its power resources to engage in influence 
activities, these power mechanisms are what guide target states to change their behavior in 
favor of the influencer’s preferences, generating influence through leverage, admiration, 
or goodwill.68 China has clearly mobilized its power resources in support of infrastructure 
projects in Kenya, and with such actions comes the potential to activate these power 
mechanisms.  
1. Reward and Coercion 
An influencer rewards a target state by providing it with something positive or 
shielding it from something negative.69 Equipped with this understanding, it becomes easy 
to see the opportunities for China to leverage this power mechanism through its 
infrastructure projects in Kenya. Much of Kenya’s transportation infrastructure remains 
long overdue for modernization and, for the past two decades, Beijing has demonstrated a 
willingness to provide Kenya with extensive financial and technical support to modernize 
this infrastructure. This is not to suggest that China’s motivations in Kenya are wholly 
benevolent. Kenya’s transportation infrastructure is of strategic importance to China’s 
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global ambitions. Kenya’s ports and transportation infrastructure provide China with a 
gateway into East Africa, giving China access to an estimated 230 million potential 
consumers and newly discovered energy reserves.70 China likely seeks to activate the 
reward mechanism to gain influence in Kenya, through their infrastructure development 
projects, in an effort access to Kenya’s economic corridors and commercial markets. 
The potential for influence through reward is high because infrastructure is such an 
important part of Kenya’s development strategy. These infrastructure development projects 
are central to Kenya Vision 2030 and the ambitions of President Kenyatta. When speaking 
about the Kenya SGR project, President Kenyatta said, “Without infrastructure, there will 
be no investors. Without investors there will be no jobs for our youth.”71 More than any 
foreign actor, China provides Kenya with the development assistance, deemed necessary 
by Kenya’s president, to achieve the goals outlined in Kenya Vision 2030.72 Additionally, 
in 2009 China became Kenya’s largest trading partner, with the majority of Kenya’s 
exports destined for Chinese markets.73 With a large market to export to and generous 
development aid, the relationship between Nairobi and Beijing is full of rewards. For 
China, these rewards potentially position Beijing for market access, large construction 
contracts, and dependency on Chinese technicians. Such a position comes with it the 
opportunity to activate the coercion and reward power mechanisms.  
Additionally, China is in a more financially advantageous position, a position that 
carries with it the potential for China to coerce Kenya towards certain behavior. Coercion 
entails the threat or imposition of punishment, such as trade restriction, diplomatic censure, 
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or military force.74 In the case of Kenya-China relations, such coercion could very well 
come in the form of concessions stemming from Kenya’s troubling debt owed to China. 
The Kenya SGR project for instance, has been credited for placing Kenya in financially 
precarious situation vis-à-vis China. The railway has yet to produce a profit sufficient to 
maintain its operational costs or associated debt owed to China.75 In 2016, before the 
completion of the railway, the World Bank had already warned Kenya’s heavy foreign debt 
burden, stemming largely from Chinese loans, were reaching unsustainable levels.76 These 
conditions potentially allow China to impose harsh measures. It is rumored in the case of 
the Kenya SGR project that such concessions could include a partial Chinese takeover of 
the port of Mombasa.77 However, given the history of China’s approach towards debt 
renegotiations and the importance of Kenya within China’s larger economic goals, 
leveraging such a coercive power mechanism is arguably unlikely.78 
The infrastructure development projects, largely financed and carried out by 
Chinese state-owned firms, have placed China in a position to influence Kenya through 
rewards or coercion. However, these power mechanisms have proven expensive for China, 
putting into question their sustainability. Both Kenya and China view the other as a 
valuable economic partner, contributing to each other’s larger economic ambitions. And it 
might be the case that neither wishes to jeopardize this economic relationship in pursuit of 
influence.  
More importantly, the realities of Kenyan politics limit China’s potential to gain 
influence through reward and coercion. Thus far, it appears Chinese infrastructure projects 
have done more to mobilize Kenya’s population against what it perceives as government 
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malfeasance, instead of activating the reward or coercion power mechanisms. Kenya’s 
politically active population, relatively free media, and independent branches of 
government, continue to challenge Chinese business practices and decisions from Kenya’s 
top government officials. For instance, in June 2020, Kenya’s Court of Appeals ruled that 
the Mombasa SGR contract negotiated by President Kenyatta’s administration, violated 
Article 227 (1) of the Constitution that stipulates all government purchasing decisions 
should be fair, equitable, transparent, competitive, and cost-effective.79 The Kenyan 
Parliament also demonstrated a willingness to challenge decisions from Kenya’s president 
concerning Chinese construction projects.  
In September 2020, the Kenyan Parliament faulted a recent executive order by 
President Kenyatta to establish the Kenya Transport and Logistics Network (KLTN). If 
allowed to proceed, the KLTN would have been the result of a state merger of the Kenya 
Port Authority, Kenya Railways Corporation, and Kenyan Pipeline Corporation. Kenyan 
human rights activities and transport sector workers claimed the merger would have led to 
Chinese control over the port of Mombasa.80 Opponents of the merger, claim President 
Kenyatta was hiding illegal policies behind executive order.81 Ultimately, the Kenyan 
Parliament agreed with this assessment, determining that such a merger of state-owned 
corporations could only be legitimate through new legislation, which should also involve 
public discourse due to the impact this would have on Kenyan communities.82 Grievances 
from concerned communities create additional obstacles for Chinese infrastructure 
projects. The community of Lamu provides such an example. 
In 2019, an environmental nongovernmental organization known as Save Lamu, 
succeeded in preventing the construction of a Chinese-backed coal power plant, the first of 
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its kind in Kenya.83 This group continues to engage local communities and stakeholders 
in decision-making to achieve sustainable and responsible development among the Lamu 
community.84 Their efforts have come into conflict with other Chinese development 
projects, to include a Lamu Port construction project intended to support China’s BRI.85 
The opposition of Kenya’s civil society, combined with a contingent of the Kenyan public 
against Chinese business ventures, appears to have manifested itself in Kenya’s political 
sphere to the detriment of future Chinese influence. 
If China succeeded in mobilizing the reward or coercion power mechanisms 
through infrastructure projects, it appears to have been short-lived. The lack of 
transparency surrounding the contract negotiating process has generated public pressure on 
the Kenyan government. This pressure has succeeded in exposing executive overreach into 
both legislative and constitutional purgatives. If Beijing seeks to influence the Kenya 
government through reward or coercion, these infrastructure projects highlight the 
competition China will encounter from Kenya’s civil society and political institutions.  
French and Raven show the reward and coercion power mechanisms run the risk of 
being expensive and non-sustainable.86 A state which uses these power mechanisms can 
induce short-term changes in a target state’s behavior, but have a greater risk of requiring 
extensive inducements or willingness to enact severe punishments when threats fail.87 The 
other power mechanisms—legitimacy, attractiveness, recognition, and expertise—can 
produce more long-term and self-sustaining changes in a target state’s behavior.88  
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The expertise mechanism is activated when the target state shifts its behaviors due 
to its respect for the influencer’s knowledge or skills.89 Influence activities that highlight 
the influencer’s information and proficiencies, such as technical assistance, engage the 
expertise mechanism.90 From the construction of Jing-Hang Grand Canal in the 7th century 
to the construction of the Three Gorges Dam in the 21st century, China has established 
unquestionable ability in large infrastructure projects. Such projects have become a matter 
of national pride to the Chinese people.91 China’s state-owned CRBC continues to 
demonstrate this pedigree through its tunnel, airway, port, highway, and railway projects 
across the globe.  
Given this background of expertise, Chinese infrastructure projects in Kenya 
appear well positioned to activate the expertise power mechanism. Chinese firms have 
become world renowned for the construction of large-scale infrastructure projects, 
associating Chinese construction firms with world-class expertise in construction. 
Nathaniel Matalango, President of the Institute of Engineers of Kenya, said as much 
regarding Chinese firms saying, “Chinese contractors have helped the country because they 
have better technology as well as new ways of labor management that ensure projects are 
completed on time.”92 This acknowledgement of Chinese expertise opens avenues for 
Chinese influence. 
One way in which expertise may lead to influence is through the government’s 
contracting decisions. Potentially, the expertise power mechanism was at play during the 
tendering process of the SGR and Thika Highway projects. In this case, Kenya’s 
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contracts went to Chinese firms. Kenya’s Transport and Infrastructure Cabinet Secretary, 
James Macharia, has defended the awarding of construction contracts to Chinese firms, 
claiming local contractors could not deliver the quality of work nor the speed of Chinese 
contractors.93 Some ordinary Kenyans have given Chinese construction firms praise that 
is similar to Macharia’s description.94 These admiring comments suggest that the expertise 
mechanism may be at work in government decisions, regarding the awarding construction 
contracts.  
This expertise-driven influence can backfire in ways that prevent the mechanism’s 
future effectiveness. Kenyan construction firms were quick to criticize the preferential 
treatment forwarded to Chinese firms. Although the SGR and Thika Highway projects 
employed thousands of Kenyans, higher level positions were occupied by Chinese 
workers.95 Additionally, some materials required for the construction of these projects, 
such as concrete, were sourced through Chinese vendors, despite the prevalence of local 
ones.96 Lastly, a common complaint among many Kenyan construction firms is the lack 
of skills transfer between Chinese technical experts and Kenyan workers, who will 
inevitably take over the operation and maintenance activities. One engineer student, and 
critic of the Kenyan’s government handling of Chinese lead infrastructure projects, Wilfred 
Gachugi, sums up the concern among many skilled workers within Kenya saying, “It will 
be a pity if indeed we achieve the Vision 2030, which will be in fact, a vision made in 
China.”97  
The concerns stemming from the perceived preferential treatment towards Chinese 
expertise have triggered a response from the Kenyan government. Former Kenyan Prime 
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Minister Raila Odinga justified the employment practices of Chinese firms and the 
contracting processes of the Kenyan government by re-stating the importance expertise, 
saying that Chinese firms were professional, produced quality work, and at lower cost to 
the local competition.98 Later, however, President Kenyatta changed course. For instance, 
President Kenyatta stated future construction projects will use available local vendors for 
construction materials.99 Additionally, in order to prevent dependence on Chinese 
technical experts for the operation and maintenance of the SGR, the Kenyan Government 
and the CRBC have agreed to properly transfer technical knowledge to Kenyan 
workers.100 This agreement is responsible for the creation of a Technology Transfer 
Competence Training Facility in Voi, financed by the CRBC and meant to train Kenya 
workers on the operation and maintenance of the SGR.101 
This research has found that the expertise mechanism likely reached its limit when 
the Kenyan government sought to promote skills transfer and a fair-minded contracting 
process. The argument that the expertise mechanism was activated in the early negotiation 
of these projects is valid, yet Kenyan businesses appear to have limited such influence. It 
could also be a matter of cost, rather than expertise, when Kenya’s government awarded 
Chinese firms with government contracts, seeing them as a cheaper than local firms. 
Regardless of these limits, such large-scale projects still carry the potential to activate other 
power mechanisms.  
3. Attraction and Legitimacy 
In the attraction power mechanism, the target state identifies with the influencer or 
desires that sense of identification.102 Here the target state wants to be like the influencer 
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or become a member of the influencer’s social, economic, or political circle.103 Any 
activity that highlights the influencer’s attractive characteristics can mobilize this power 
mechanism. In the legitimacy power mechanism, the target state views the influencer as a 
valid authority figure, which could arise from the influencer’s role in transnational 
advocacy networks, leadership in international organizations, or formal positions, such as 
being a permanent member of the UN Security Council.104 In the case of Kenya-China 
relations, China’s rise as an economic giant and its efforts to gain more geopolitical 
influence, suggest the potential relevance of these power mechanisms.  
Since implementing free market reforms in 1979, China’s economy maintained a 
9.5% average of real annual GDP growth through 2018, a pace described by the World 
Bank as, “the fastest sustained expansion by a major economy in history.”105 China’s 
economic advancement has allowed it to cultivate the image as a legitimate alternative to 
Western promoted economic development models. China’s BRI represents a grand strategy 
to maintain China’s economic momentum and increase its economic significance across 
the globe.106 All these factors contribute towards China’s image as a global economic 
leader and the desire for states to be a part of China’s economic circle. Membership within 
China’s BRI provides an avenue for states to become a part of this economic circle.  
Creating six economic corridors to connect Asia, Europe and Africa, touching an 
estimated 60% of the world’s population in the process, China’s BRI has the potential to 
significantly expand Kenya’s export and investment markets.107 Indeed, Kenya’s own 
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“The Belt and Road Initiative gives our continent the opportunity to make a paradigm shift. 
Post-colonial Africa has been stuck in a rut. Being part of One Belt allows the continent to 
move to a new platform, through which global collaboration will allow for value-addition, 
innovation and increased prosperity.”108 Since it joined BRI, Kenya’s membership has 
brought improvements to the port of Mombasa, the construction of a modern port in Lamu, 
and standard gauge railway construction across the country, validating Kenyatta’s previous 
statement in the eyes of many.109 Given these circumstances, it appears conditions for the 
attraction mechanism are present through China’s BRI and Kenya’s desire to become a part 
of this economic circle.  
Additionally, China’s economic rise and global engagement has positioned Beijing 
as an authority figure in several ways, making the activation of the legitimacy mechanism 
a possibility. China’s geopolitical position gives its plenty of opportunity to demonstrate 
itself as a legitimate authority figure. As one of the permanent members of the UN Security 
Council, a prominent member within the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa 
(BRICS) economic association, and as the founder of the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC), China maintains credible geopolitical leadership. The speaker of 
Kenya’s National Assembly, Justin Muturi, underscored the importance of FOCAC saying, 
“China has over the years cultivated a strategic partnership with the continent [Africa], 
which today is the Forum for China Africa Cooperation…Kenya cherishes the milestone 
made in the history of China-Africa relations through this forum, which has grown in 
strength since its inception.”110 Further enhancing this position, is China’s previously 
mentioned economic achievements and status as the world’s second largest economy. With 
these factors in mind, opportunities to activate the legitimacy power mechanism appear 
salient in the case of Kenya-China relations.  
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Despite rhetoric from Kenya’s senior officials, Kenya’s behavior has yet to indicate 
a clear instance of Chinese influence through the legitimacy mechanism. Although 
President Kenyatta has visited China more than any previous president, and continues to 
attend the FOCAC summit and the BRI forum in Beijing, thus far, his visits served to 
underscore Kenyatta’s intention of maintaining a steady economic partnership with 
China.111 Typically, when Kenyatta returns from Beijing, he announces the signing of a 
new trade agreement or investment deal, in what appears to be an effort to cultivate his 
own image as a leader guiding Kenya towards economic prosperity, and not toward any 
new legitimate international authority.112  
In summary, the potential for both the attraction and legitimacy power mechanisms 
appears well grounded through China’s economic achievements and BRI ambitions. 
However, these power mechanisms have yet to manifest themselves into changed behavior 
from Kenya. Additionally, both these power mechanisms appear to hinge on China’s 
continued economic progress and the fulfillment of the BRI’s ambitions. Since the latter 
has yet to fully come to fruition, and the former is by no means guaranteed, the likelihood 
of these power mechanisms achieving lasting influence remains uncertain.  
4. Recognition 
The recognition power mechanism is activated when the influencer identifies the 
target state in a positive way and the target state adjusts its behavior in response to this 
recognition.113 Here the influencer’s recognition creates a sense of goodwill that stimulates 
the target to align its behavior with the influencer’s preferences. Essentially, this power 
mechanism acts similarly to the attraction mechanism, only in reverse—the influencer in 
this case identifies the target state in a favorable way.114 Such instances of recognition are 
prominent among Kenya-China relations.  
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At President Uhuru Kenyatta’s inauguration ceremony in April 2013, China was 
the only country, outside of Africa, to send a high-ranking envoy to the event.115 Likely a 
reciprocal gesture, China’s flag was the only pennant of a foreign country outside of Africa 
to occupy a flagstaff at the ceremony.116 This recognition was more than a matter of 
diplomatic protocol and showed China’s acknowledgement of Uhuru Kenyatta as a 
legitimate leader at a time when Western governments accused him of crimes against 
humanity attributed to post election violence in 2007.117  
Following his inauguration, Kenyatta’s first official visit outside of Africa was to 
China, where he was credited with cementing new economic ties with Chinese officials 
and investors.118 These economic ties eventually became a preferred anecdote when 
Beijing describes China-Africa relations. At the 2018 FOCAC in Beijing, Chinese officials 
touted Kenya’s SGR as a model for how Chinese projects were, “changing the face of 
Africa,” and praised officials in Nairobi for their efforts in fostering a fruitful relationship 
with Beijing.119  
China has repeatedly recognized Uhuru Kenyatta for refuting criticism from 
Western governments. In April 2019, Xi Jinping praised Kenyatta in Beijing for his stance 
against Western criticism concerning Chinese investment practices in Africa.120 Such 
criticism included the accusation that China’s investment strategy in Africa constituted 
‘debt trap’ diplomacy. During the meeting between the two leaders, Xi Jinping further 
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emphasized his commitment towards promoting cooperation with Kenya and its 
infrastructure projects under BRI.121 
China’s recognition of Kenya also highlights Beijing’s opinion of Nairobi as a 
regional leader. In 2019, Xi Jinping’s special envoy State Councilor Wang Yong gave 
Kenya China’s pledge supporting Kenya’s UN Security Council bid.122 In a public 
statement, Wang said, “We [China] firmly support reforms of the UN Security Council and 
believe that Kenya will help to increase the voice of African countries.”123 In June 2020, 
Kenya won the two thirds majority of the UN General Assembly vote required for its 
Security Council seat.  
In short, this research has found instances where China recognized Kenya in a 
positive way, making the prospect for Kenya to align its behavior in favor of Beijing’s 
interests likely. This research, however, was not able to attribute any behavior from the 
Kenyan government to Chinese recognition. Instead, it could only conclude the potential 
for such influence. Next, this research will assess the nature of Russian activities in Kenya 
and their potential to activate the various power mechanisms.  
D. BACKGROUND: KENYA-RUSSIA RELATIONS  
Since gaining its independence in 1963, Kenya has maintained cordial relations 
with Russia. Kenya’s non-alignment policy during the Cold War allowed Jomo Kenyatta’s 
government to reconcile with the British and other Western countries, while at the same 
time pursuing bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union.124 Although relations remained 
cordial between Kenya and Russia during the Cold War, the partnership never grew beyond 
a few small-scale development projects and minor trade agreements.  
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The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent economic turmoil that plagued 
Russia made an already minor partnership virtually irrelevant. It was not until Vladimir 
Putin’s reign that Russia-Kenya relations gained some relevance in Russian foreign policy. 
Despite this, Russia’s engagement with Kenya has remained limited when compared to its 
involvement with other African countries. The same is true for Kenya. When compared to 
its interaction with other foreign powers—namely China, India, the EU and the US—
Nairobi’s relationship with Moscow hardly registers. However, rhetoric from Presidents 
Putin and Kenyatta could indicate a shift in Russia’s approach towards East Africa, 
signaling Kenya’s increasing importance to Russia’s foreign policy objectives in Africa.  
Vladimir Putin’s Kremlin has established a renewed interest in Russia-Africa 
relations. Highlighting this renewal was the 2019 Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi. 
Modelled after China’s FOCAC, the Russia-Africa Summit facilitated bilateral 
engagement between African heads of state, Kremlin officials, and the Russian business 
community, ending with multiple bilateral energy, mining, infrastructure, and security 
sector agreements.125 The summit signaled to African leaders Russian interest in the 
African continent, an interest which reemerged in 2014 following the economic sanctions 
imposed on Russia over its actions involving Ukraine. With this economic constraint, new 
markets became more relevant for Russian oligarchs and business firms. As a result, 
Russian energy, mining, and security firms have become increasingly prevalent on the 
continent.  
Thus far, the Russia-Kenya partnership remains modest. Economically, annual 
trade between the two countries averages around $200 million per year.126 Kenyan exports 
to Russia are mostly agriculture products, with Russian imports consisting mostly of 
cereals, iron, and steel.127 Kenya’s famous tourism industry only attracts 10,000 Russian 
 




visitors annually.128 And for Russia, known across the continent as a provider of military 
equipment, Kenya has only bought three Mi-17 helicopters from Russia’s inventory in the 
past two decades.129 Serbia serves as Kenya’s primary supplier of Soviet-era military 
equipment, which are becoming less relied by Kenyan security forces.130 In short, the 
economic engagement between Russia and Kenya is minimal. 
Russia’s energy and mining firms also maintain a modest presence in Kenya. The 
two countries signed a memorandum for cooperation in peaceful use of nuclear technology, 
and Kenya’s council of Nuclear Energy maintains a dialogue with Russia’s nuclear agency 
Rosatom, but no major project has yet to emerge after more than a decade of dialogue.131 
As for other Russian energy firms, such as Gasprom or Lukoil, they have yet to establish 
significant operations within Kenya. And when it comes to Russian mining firms, who 
operate elsewhere on the continent, they also have yet to establish operations in Kenya. All 
these factors have not gone unnoticed by Russia’s foreign policy officials, and recent 
rhetoric from Vladimir Putin, discussed below, could indicate an intention to redefine what 
historically has been a modest partnership. 
E. REDEFINING THE RELATIONSHIP 
Paul Stronksi, a senior fellow with the Carnegie Endowment, described, “Russia’s 
clout in Africa [remains] tied to a handful of client states with relatively limited strategic 
influence.”132 As it stands today, Kenya remains outside this handful of client states. The 
type of Russian engagement other African countries are experiencing has yet to reach 
similar levels in Kenya. In other words, Russia’s power resources and influence activities 
have yet to become a substantive factor in Kenya-Russia relations.  
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Rhetoric between Uhuru Kenyatta and Vladimir Putin indicates the two leaders see 
the potential benefit of increasing Kenya-Russia engagement. Putin met with Kenyatta 
during the Russia-Africa Summit in 2019, with the two agreeing to establish a Russia-
Kenya business council to facilitate communication and cooperation between their 
respective business communities.133 During the summit, Putin also mentioned the 
marginal trade between the two countries, saying that it was “not enough” and that it should 
double within the next five years.134 Kenyatta expressed a similar need to enhance the 
economic engagement between the two countries saying, “to enhance the shared 
development of our two countries we need to deepen our people to people contact…over 
cooperation in security and defense, trade and investment, tourism, energy, culture, 
science, and technology.”135 Clearly, both Kenyatta and Putin share an interest towards 
increasing the ties between their two countries, which could possibly signal the beginning 
of a new Kenya-Russia relationship. 
Whether or not the two leaders bring about this new relationship will determine the 
potential influence Russia might gain in the process. Presently, Russia’s power resources 
and influence activities have yet to establish a considerable foothold within Kenya. This 
could be a product of Russia’s current renewal of interest in Africa and that Russia is only 
beginning to build what it intends to be a more influential presence on the continent.136 
Should Putin’s statements from Sochi manifest themselves into action, then the potential 
for influence becomes plausible. 
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This chapter has found that China is economically important to Kenya and that the 
mobilization of China’s vast power resources sets conditions for the great influence 
potential for Beijing. As a result, President Kenyatta has emphasized the importance of 
Kenya-China relations to the success of Kenya’s future. Despite this seemingly extensive 
influence potential, this research has identified some limiting factors. First, as 
demonstrated from Kenya’s Supreme Court ruling and parliamentary determinations, 
Kenya demonstrates a commitment to the rule of law over the ambitions of its executive. 
Second, Kenya’s civil society has taken an active role shaping Kenya-China relations to 
ensure greater transparency and accountability with their government’s engagement with 
Chinese business firms. Ultimately, this research has identified Kenya’s political landscape 
as the primary limiting factor to Chinese influence.  
In the case of Russia, this research has found limitations to influence, due in large 
measure to the marginal power resources mobilized by Russia in the region. Both Kenyatta 
and Putin have expressed interest in furthering the ties between their respective countries, 
which might result in the increase of Russian power resources in the region, but this 
remains to be seen. Based off China’s experience with their own objectives in Kenya, this 
research assumes Russia will likely face similar challenges, regardless of the power 
resources the Kremlin mobilizes. Should Kenya and Russia redefine their relationship 
through meaningful action, the literature would benefit from focusing on the Kenya’s 
political landscape and how it shapes the trajectory of Kenya-Russia relations.  
  
40 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
41 
III. SOUTH AFRICA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores the potential of Chinese and Russian influence in the context 
of South Africa. First, this chapter will provide a background to Chinese-South African 
relations, involved power resources, and the potential activation of the various power 
mechanisms. In the case of China, this research identified a unique dynamic to its bilateral 
relationship with South Africa. Specifically, the party-to-party engagement between the 
ANC and CCP generates some potential influence for Beijing. At the same time, South 
Africa’s political landscape reveals some limitations to foreign influence over domestic 
institutional decision making. 
Next, this chapter will provide a background to Russia-South Africa relations, 
Russian power resources mobilized, and the potential power mechanisms activated in the 
process. A key limitation of Russian influence in South Africa revolves around a failed bi-
lateral nuclear power arrangement, which exposed instances of corruption and Russian 
overreach. There is growing interest in building upon existing military-to-military 
engagement between Russia and South Africa, which could bring about greater Russian 
influence within South Africa. 
B. BACKGROUND: CHINA-SOUTH AFRICA RELATIONS 
Before the apartheid regime came to an end in 1994, South Africa maintained no 
official ties with Beijing. Instead, South Africa recognized the Republic of China (ROC) 
as the legitimate government of China and established diplomatic relations with Taipei. 
Furthering this divide, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) supported anti-apartheid 
groups, such as the Pan African Congress, throughout the anti-apartheid struggle. In 1997, 
a few years after the end of apartheid, South Africa’s ruling political party, the African 
National Congress (ANC), reversed South African policy towards Beijing and adopted a 
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one-China position, asserting the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the only sovereign 
state under the name China.137 This opened a new era for China-South Africa relations. 
Official diplomatic relations between the PRC and South Africa began in 1998. By 
1999, Premier Hu Jintao and President Nelson Mandela had officially visited each other’s 
countries. Mandela’s visit to China stressed promoting bilateral trade and cultural 
exchanges. Addressing Peking University in 1999, Mandela praised the “unwavering 
political, diplomatic, and material support of the Chinese people and government for South 
Africa’s liberation.”138 He continued, highlighting the shared experience of China and 
South Africa as victims of colonial rule.139 Subsequent South African administrations 
would echo this narrative, sometimes conveying anti-Western rhetoric and China-South 
African solidarity, with the Pretoria Declaration being a prime example. 
In 2000, Chinese President Jian Zemin and South African President Thabo Mbeki 
signed the Pretoria Declaration on the Partnership Between the People’s Republic of China 
and the Republic of South Africa. This declaration announced their shared commitment 
towards developing countries and a commitment to strengthen one another’s, “capacity for 
co-operation and mutual support in the international system.”140 Although other 
agreements came from this official declaration—police cooperation, maritime transport, 
arts, and cultural exchanges—the core of the Pretoria Declaration announced the dedication 
the two countries shared towards enhancing cooperation among developing countries. This 
emphasis highlighted a South-South Cooperation and the need to reform the “international 
multilateral political, economic and financial architecture to reflect new global 
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realities.”141 In essence, the Pretoria Declaration provided the foundational framework for 
future China-South Africa relations and the solidarity the two shared on the international 
level. It also established several mechanisms through which Beijing and Pretoria would 
interact, chief among them was a Bi-National Commission. 
Launched in 2001, the Bi-National Commission (BNC) provided government-to-
government coordination on all matters of mutual interest. This accelerated economic 
activity between the two countries, and within a decade South Africa became China’s 
largest trading partner on the African continent.142 South Africa was among the 35 African 
countries to attend the first Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Summit (FOCAC) in 2006 
and would host the first summit-level FOCAC on the African continent in 2015. Economic 
ties between the two countries remained strong during the 2008 global financial crisis, 
which China and South Africa endured better than most, further vindicating the alternative 
vision to the ‘Bretton Woods” institutions shared between Beijing and Pretoria.143 
By 2009, China had become South Africa’s largest trading partner, surpassing the 
United States. In 2010, South Africa became the fifth member of the group of major 
emerging national economies known today by the acronym BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, and South Africa). In 2015, South Africa joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI), bringing increased Chinese presence in South Africa’s infrastructure, industrial, and 
telecommunications industries.  
In the political realm, beginning in 2009, President Jacob Zuma increased 
interaction between his ruling party and the CCP. This relationship emphasized political 
training for ANC members at the China Executive Leadership Academy in Shanghai, 
where CCP members and foreign guests receive classes on ‘revolutionary traditions’, 
media management, grass roots political mobilization, party management, and cadre 
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development.144 Some observers claim that South African President Jacob Zuma began 
modeling the ANC after the CCP following these training engagements.145 This party-to-
party engagement continued into the administration of President Cyril Ramaphosa, who 
often emphasized the benefits stemming from these interactions.146 
In summary, the history of China-South Africa engagement has resulted in a strong 
diplomatic, economic, and political relationship between the two countries. The 
characteristic of this engagement demonstrates the strategic significance both countries 
attribute to this bi-lateral relationship. As a result, the potential for Chinese influence over 
South Africa appears high. Next, this chapter will analyze Chinese influence through the 
various power mechanisms, highlighting both the potential and limits of Chinese influence. 
C. POWER MECHANISMS 
China’s extensive power resources are unquestionably mobilized in the South 
African context. China is South Africa’s largest trading partner, controlling 10.7% of its 
total exports and 18.5% of total imports.147 With 59% of South Africa’s GDP tied to trade, 
China is key to South Africa’s economic development.148 Additionally, South Africa’s 
unstable currency and low IMF credit rating slowed foreign investment into South Africa, 
which contributed towards its economic stagnation, making Chinese investment a boon for 
South Africa’s economy. South Africa continues to struggle with high unemployment, 
especially among South Africa’s youth, becoming an economic and political challenge to 
the ruling ANC.149 Addressing these issues, South Africa’s government has focused on 
improving its infrastructure, with China playing an integral role. 
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1. Reward and Coercion 
Since 2014, South African projects received $2.2 billion from China.150 During the 
2018 BRICS summit, China pledged to invest $14.7 billion more in South Africa, which 
would include loans to South Africa state-owned Eskom and Transnet.151 These Chinese 
investments provide much needed financial resources in modernizing South Africa’s 
transportation and energy infrastructure, which the South African government has 
struggled to maintain and modernize. Chinese investments have given particular emphasis 
towards modernizing South Africa’s Richards Bay and Durban port facilities, two 
strategically vital ports for South African export industries.152 Given this significant 
mobilization of power resources, it would appear China maintains a strong position to 
leverage the reward and coercion mechanism over the South African government to further 
its own interests.  
However, the previous administration of Jacob Zuma showed the limits of Chinese 
influence over a democracy that maintains strong institutional checks on the executive and 
a country where government officials are sensitive to business practices that deviate from 
South African law. The Gupta family state capture scandal, which forced President Zuma’s 
resignation, has energized South Africa’s political opposition, who have become 
increasingly sensitive to potential instances of high-level corruption. Transnet, one of the 
entities implicated in the scandal and a recipient of Chinese loans, has drawn particular 
scrutiny, with cases of spending ‘irregularities’ in its business operations.153 This has 
significantly slowed Chinese investments, progress on their construction projects, and 
President Ramaphosa’s infrastructure ambitions. It also serves as indication of the 
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limitations on China’s influence in South Africa’s institutional decision making, despite 
China’s large financial commitments. Chinese commitment towards South Africa’s 
infrastructure is relatively new, and their success may hinge on the relationship between 
the ANC and CCP. It is this party-to-party relationship and China’s political expertise 
where another potential for influence lies. 
2. Expertise  
Party-to-party interactions represent one activity with strong potential to mobilize 
the expertise mechanism. As previously mentioned, the ANC has engaged with the CCP 
for its own political training since President Zuma’s administration. In 2009, the ANC and 
CCP signed a memorandum of understanding on China’s enhanced efforts to train ANC 
members in China.154 Since then, the ANC sent members of its National Executive 
Committee to China for training on the Chinese ruling party’s political philosophy and 
practices.155 In 2015, an ANC senior delegation visited China to receive specific training 
on the CCP’s implementation of the Central Committees initiatives at grass roots level.156 
The ANC Secretary General included in his strategy before the 2019 parliamentary 
elections to send a cadre of ANC members to China to receive training in communication 
strategies and other political skills.157 
ANC members clearly see the CCP’s political expertise as valuable to their own 
political ambitions. Reflecting on the CCP’s instruction, Ramaphosa stated the ANC 
“gained so much” from the CCP’s training.158 Samson Gwede Mantashe, a senior ANC 
Chairperson, spoke of how the training provided by the CCP gave an example for the 
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ANC’s own ruling philosophy and party building theory.159 In 2019, the Deputy President 
of the ANC, David Mabuza, spoke of these trainings, emphasizing how they furthered the 
“core interests” of the ANC and CCP.160  
This party-to-party relationship allows China to maintain a unique connection with 
South Africa’s political elites. Some claim this engagement allows the CCP to export its 
own foreign policy objectives through training that favors Chinese ‘core interests’, a term 
which some interpret to mean those issues that are of a sensitive nature to Beijing, such as 
human rights allegations and Taiwanese sovereignty.161 As a result, many South Africans 
have been quick to criticize this party-to-party engagement. Critics of Zuma claim the 
former president began modeling the ANC after the CCP and that China’s political training 
has encouraged behavior characteristic of authoritarian regimes.162  
Partly fueling this criticism is Chinese technological support and the development 
of smart cities in South Africa, with Chinese technological expertise assisting in this 
endeavor. An essential part of BRI is China’s ‘Digital Silk Road Initiative’, which aims to 
integrate China’s state-owned technology company Huawei Technologies Co. (referred 
hereafter as Huawei) into BRI members’ broadband telecommunications networks.163 
Providing technical support and equipment to South Africa’s four largest 
telecommunications companies, Huawei plays an integral role in South Africa’s 
information economy and the development of its fifth-generation broadband 
telecommunications network. Given South Africa’s need to modernize its broadband 
network, a recognized necessity to engage in the world’s information economy, Chinese 
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technological expertise clearly provides South Africa with this much needed 
modernization. 
South African President Cyril Ramaphosa has acknowledged the importance of 
Huawei with his country’s economy, defending its practices against pressure from Western 
powers, who stand in opposition to Huawei’s activities in developing countries. The U.S. 
and EU accuse the CCP of installing ‘backdoor’ vulnerabilities within Huawei’s hardware, 
which presumably would allow nefarious cyber actors to exploit the network. Another 
narrative claims that importing Huawei 5G networks, is akin to importing a Chinese style 
surveillance state.164 Both these narratives imply potential for Chinese influence in foreign 
countries because it enables China to exploit network vulnerabilities in pursuit of its own 
interests. Additionally, the entrenchment of Huawei within South Africa’s broadband 
infrastructure makes South Africa dependent on Chinese expertise, a dependency Beijing 
could leverage to shape South African behavior.  
This expertise-based influence appears to be working to some extent. President 
Ramaphosa has strongly defended his country’s endorsement of Huawei, seeing the 
Chinese telecommunications company as an integral element to South Africa’s economic 
advancement.165 In his opening remarks at the 2019 South Africa Digital Economy 
Summit, Ramaphosa criticized the U.S. saying, “The United States has been unable to 
imagine a better future which goes beyond 4 plus 1G…they are jealous that a Chinese 
company called Huawei has outstripped them. And because they have been outstripped, 
they must now punish that one company and use it as a pawn in the fight they have with 
China.”166 While this rhetoric might illustrate an example of the legitimacy mechanism, it 
underscores South Africa’s respect for China’s technological expertise.  
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While it is difficult to attribute a shift in South Africa’s behavior to China’s political 
and technological expertise, it remains the case that the potential for influence through the 
expertise mechanism is strong. The party-to-party engagement between the ANC and CCP 
forwards Beijing an unparalleled relationship with South Africa’s ruling party. Further 
entrenching this relationship, is South Africa’s commitment towards implementing Huawei 
technology towards its own telecommunications modernization. Given South Africa’s 
behavior towards China’s political and technological expertise, the attraction and 
legitimacy mechanisms might provide more concrete instances of Chinese influence.  
3. Attraction and Legitimacy 
It would appear South Africa identifies with China, desires that sense of 
identification, or wants to become a member of its economic circle. Both share an anti-
colonial heritage, identify as leading members of the Global South, maintain skepticism 
towards Western institutions, and are strategic players within their regions.167 Beginning 
with President Zuma, South Africa has shifted foreign policy with a particular emphasis 
towards closer ties with China. South Africa increasingly views Beijing as a legitimate 
leader among developing nations, whose own economic model provides an example for 
South Africa’s own political and economic development.168  
China’s ability to weather the 2008 global financial crisis by maintaining economic 
growth, vindicated its economic model in the eyes Jacob Zuma. During his 2009 
presidential campaign, Zuma incorporated closer China-South Africa ties as one of his 
foreign policy agenda items.169 Although momentum for China-South Africa relations was 
building before Zuma’s presidency, Zuma’s administration witnessed a pivot towards 
China for addressing South Africa’s own economic stagnation.170 Zuma viewed China’s 
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‘Asian-style development state’, as a viable alternative to the Western-style economic 
models, which he viewed as being flawed and an impediment to the economic development 
of the Global South.171  
In 2010, Zuma’s administration further integrated South Africa into China’s 
economic circle when it joined BRICS, an alternative to the western oriented G-7 grouping. 
A few years later, China-South Africa relations were upgraded to a comprehensive strategic 
partnership and in 2014 South Africa became a BRI member. All these instances illustrate 
South Africa’s attraction towards China and a desire to further integrate into China’s 
economic circle. Zuma’s closing remarks at the 2015 FOCAC summit in Johannesburg 
confirms this when he lauded China-South Africa relations as a “win-win” and that other 
African nations should pursue closer economic ties with China.172 Zuma’s successor 
continued to emphasize the importance of China-South African relations and has become 
one of China’s more prominent African supporters.173 
President Ramaphosa has maintained a positive tone towards China and its 
leadership. Speaking at the BRICS summit in 2019, Ramaphosa praised the Chinese people 
for their, “great economic and social achievements,” which he attributed to the leadership 
of its ruling party.174 Ramaphosa went out to condemn “bullying tactics” against China 
and the unfair treatment of Chinese businesses from Western governments.175 Many see 
this rhetoric as being aimed at China’s Western critics, the U.S. chief among them, who 
assert China is engaging in ‘debt-trap’ diplomacy and exportation of its own brand of 
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authoritarian rule.176 Ramaphosa continues to dismiss such criticism, going so far as to 
call it a symptom of “jealousy” from nations who choose to distance themselves from 
Beijing.177 
It would appear Ramaphosa’s favorable view towards China is reflected in South 
Africa’s population. A 2018 Pew Research Center survey saw 46% of South Africans 
polled responding favorably to China, with 35% responding unfavorably.178 In a 2014/
2015 Afrobarometer poll, 41% of South Africans polled saw China’s economic activities 
as having a lot of influence on their country, with 28% viewing China as having some 
influence on their economy.179 Both these polls, show an increase in positive perceptions 
compared to previous years. Seeing that South Africa remains an active democracy, with 
its elected officials beholden to public scrutiny, South Africa’s favorable public opinion 
complements the attraction and legitimacy mechanisms, serving to vindicate Ramaphosa’s 
own approach towards Beijing and further Chinese influence.  
In short, South Africa sees its relations with China as central to its own economic 
development. Having demonstrated unparalleled economic growth, which was sustained 
during the 2009 financial crisis, China’s economic model has attracted the attention of 
South African leaders, who view Beijing as a legitimate alternative to Western powers. 
Both share membership in various multinational fora and both have shown the other 
support through these international venues. As it stands today, the South African President 
clearly sees Beijing as valid authority figure on the world stage and its engagement with 
the African continent a benefit for its African partners.  
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Both China and South Africa recognize the importance of their bilateral 
relationship. On the international stage, China became South Africa’s chief advocate for 
its ascension into BRICS in 2010.180 Economically, Chinese officials described South 
Africa as a locomotive for the continent’s industrialization and economic development.181 
South African diplomats working with Chinese diplomats at the UNSC level, underscored 
the willingness of the Chinese to, “genuinely seek out, consult and integrate South African 
views in formulating UNSC positions.”182 This recognition of South Africa illustrates the 
importance Beijing harbors towards its relations with South Africa and its commitment 
towards strengthening economic ties.  
China’s recognition of South Africa appears to be working. Since it began to 
prioritize its relations with China, South Africa has aligned itself with China on issues 
particularly sensitive to Chinese interests. For example, in 2009, President Zuma, barred 
the Dhali Lhama’s visit to South Africa, a clear departure from previous president Nelson 
Mandela who received the Dalai Lama in 1998 and protested China’s human rights record 
in Tibet.183 The timing of Zuma’s decision draws particular attention for South African’s 
suspicious of China-South Africa relations. It came less than a year before South Africa 
joined BRICS, a move that received Beijing support. Since its ascension into the BRICS 
group, the ANC continued to block any official visit of the Dalai Lama and stopped 
criticism towards China’s human rights record in Tibet. The Zuma era would bring other 
instances of South African alignment with Chinese core issues.  
South Africa accused the U.S. and other western powers of overreach when 
Muamar Ghaddafi was overthrown in 2011. This in effect echoed Beijing’s criticism 
towards the west. Another instance of South Africa alignment with China’s core issues, 
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and another departure from previous administrations, has been South African silence 
regarding accusations of the Chinese government abusing ethnic and religious 
minorities.184 Lastly, South Africa maintains a ‘One China Policy’ and avoids a 
relationship with Taiwan that could jeopardize its relationship with China. These instances 
of South African alignment with Chinese core issues largely continues under the leadership 
of President Ramaphosa. At the international level, such Chinese-South African alignment 
was well received in Beijing, who reinforced this behavior by recognizing South Africa’s 
autonomy and willingness not to be subject to Western pressure.185 
D. BACKGROUND: RUSSIA-SOUTH AFRICA RELATIONS 
In the 1980s, the Soviet Union became the principal source of foreign military 
equipment and training to the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa.186 The primary 
recipient of this assistance was South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) and its 
armed wing the Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK). Soviet support maintained an ideological and 
geopolitical purpose. Ideologically, the anti-communist apartheid regime, which 
maintained repressive white minority control over a disenfranchised black majority, 
represented class struggle in the eyes of Soviet onlookers. Geopolitically, South Africa 
represented another element of the ongoing competition against the West and Russia’s 
communist competitor, China.187 During this period, an estimated 3,000 ANC and MK 
activists would visit the Soviet Union to receive political and military training.188 This 
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The ideological and geopolitical underpinnings that facilitated Soviet-ANC ties 
began to deteriorate when Mikhail Gorbechev and Boris Yeltsin started to reshape Russian 
relations with the West. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 witnessed Moscow’s 
cancellation of direct funding to the ANC and retraction of the Kremlin’s involvement 
abroad. Yeltsin’s hosting of apartheid President De Klerk’s visit to Russia in 1992, while 
refusing a visit to the newly freed Nelson Mandela, signaled to the ANC that relations with 
Moscow were different now the Cold War had ended. In short, the Yeltsin years saw a 
retraction in Moscow’s engagement with African governments, a trend which initially 
continued under his successor Vladimir Putin. 
During Vladimir Putin’s first two terms as Russia’s President, South Africa 
remained low on Moscow’s foreign policy agenda. In 2006, Putin visited South Africa to 
facilitate commercial ties between Russian businesses and the South African government. 
This state visit culminated with the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Partnership 
Between the Republic of South Africa and The Russian Federation, which declared a 
shared commitment of friendly relations, sustainable development, international standards, 
non-alignment movement, and fight international terrorism, among other things.189 
Largely a symbolic gesture, little else would come from this state visit in terms of 
enhancing ties between the two countries. Putin’s successor, Dimitri Medvedev, visiting 
Africa in 2009, did not include South Africa on his itinerary.190 In short, the first decade 
of the 21st Century saw little substantive change in Russia-South Africa relations, but 
change would come through a more ambitious Putin and the rise of Jacob Zuma to the 
South African presidency. 
President Zuma sought closer ties between South Africa and Russia. In 2010, Zuma 
and Medvedev declared that the 2006 Treaty of Friendship constituted a strategic 
partnership between the two countries, symbolically elevating bi-lateral relations. South 
Africa’s rhetoric through international platforms and stances on geopolitical issues began 
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to align with Russian interests during this time. Zuma’s presidency saw South Africa’s 
incorporation in the BRICS group of emerging economies, where during his first BRICS 
summit, Zuma openly criticized the West’s “overreach” in Libya—despite having voted in 
favor of a Libyan no fly zone during a previous session of the UN General Assembly.191 
In March 2014, South Africa abstained from voting regarding Ukraine’s territorial integrity 
and dodged criticizing Russia’s proxy war in Eastern Ukraine.192 In a statement, Zuma 
justified this action saying it was, “important to close ranks with fellow BRICS 
members.”193 One reason for this increased alignment with the Kremlin involves the 
personal ties between Zuma and Moscow.  
Following his release from prison in 1973, Jacob Zuma continued his anti-apartheid 
struggle in exile, where he would spend time in the Soviet Union for training.194 In 1980, 
he took over as the ANC’s counterintelligence branch, where he frequently interacted with 
East German and Soviet advisors.195 Zuma would rise through the ranks of the ANC, 
eventually becoming its Chief of Intelligence Officer, further exposing him to Soviet 
advisors. It was during this time, that Zuma began establishing an extensive network of 
Russian connections, some speculate this would come to influence his presidency’s 
Russian leaning approach.196 Whatever the reason for Zuma’s increased engagement with 
Moscow, often opaque in nature, it would contribute to Zuma’s eventual political ruin. A 
controversial nuclear deal between South Africa and Russia, among other instances of 
high-level corruption and state capture, helped end Zuma’s presidency and blemished the 
Kremlin’s reputation in Pretoria.  
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E. POWER MECHANISMS 
In terms of its power resources, the Russian Federation is a far cry from the Soviet 
Union. The Russia-South Africa relationship, as it stands today, illustrates the limits of 
Russia’s ability to mobilize its power resources to achieve influence. Economically, 
bilateral trade between the two is marginal, constituting of only .4% of South Africa’s 
foreign trade.197 Where Russia maintained a competitive advantage, vis-à-vis South 
Africa, was through its state-owned energy firms, such as the nuclear corporation Rosatom. 
However, the way this Russian energy firm engaged with President Zuma contributed to 
Zuma’s resignation and stalled future Russian business ventures in South Africa. The 
mobilization of Russia’s military power resources in Africa has attracted particular 
attention of international observers. In the case of South Africa, evidence suggests the 
Kremlin intends to mobilize its military power resources in South Africa, offering another 
potential avenue for Russian influence.  
1. Reward and Coercion 
Seeking to expand the output of the Koeberg nuclear facility, President Zuma 
approached Rosatom for assistance. The genesis of this arrangement attracted criticism 
within Zuma’s own administration, with his finance minister, Pravin Gordhan, warning 
Zuma in 2011 that the lack of transparency surrounding Rosatom’s preferred treatment 
with President Zuma violated South African procurement policies.198 In August 2014, 
Zuma and Putin signed a nuclear cooperation deal. South African civil activists and 
political opposition were leaked information about the deal by Ecodefense. The nuclear 
arrangement, which amounted to an estimated $76 billion, bypassed South African 
procurement policies and tender laws, deliberately avoided by President Zuma.199 The 
controversy of this nuclear deal amounted to an abuse of office, adding to a list of other 
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corruption charges under investigation. Threatening a vote of no confidence by ANC 
members of parliament, Zuma resigned his office in 2018, ending the future of any Russia-
South Africa nuclear deal in the process.  
Rather than gaining an influential foothold within the South African presidency, 
through the reward of a potentially lucrative nuclear deal, the failure of this deal, arguably, 
represents an example of the Kremlin’s overreach into the domestic matters of South 
Africa. It also attracted skepticism among South African officials regarding their country’s 
dealings with Russia. Thus, the failure of this deal represents the limitations of Russia’s 
ability to use the reward mechanism to gain influence. Limitations which remain prevalent 
in sectors where Russia typically maintains a comparative advantage elsewhere in Africa. 
Russian arms dealers and energy firms have increased their involvement in Africa, 
gaining a credible reputation among African governments in the process, as well as 
potential influence for the Kremlin. Russia is currently the largest arms exporter to Africa, 
accounting for nearly 39 percent of arms transfers to the region.200 Rosatom continues to 
increase its engagement in West Africa and has the potential to outcompete its French 
counterpart, Areva, in the region.201 In the case of South Africa, traditional Russian 
business endeavors face several challenges. As a primary commodity exporter, Russia 
often finds itself in competition with South Africa’s energy exports.202 In the arms sector, 
South Africa maintains its own weapons industry. Ironically, Russian embargoes during 
the apartheid era helped create a need for South Africa’s own weapons industry, and today, 
South Africa’s weapons industry often finds itself competing with Russian firms in export 
markets.203 South Africa’s arms industry has also indicated a desire to modernize, which 
has increased its collaboration with EU arms manufacturers.204 
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In short, Russia holds limited options to activate the coercion and reward 
mechanism in its relations with South Africa. Recovering from a damaged reputation in an 
ill-fated nuclear deal and limited economic power in the South African context, Russia’s 
forced to utilize other mechanisms in pursuit of its foreign policy objectives. Historically, 
Russia provided the ANC with military expertise during its fight against apartheid and 
Russia has signaled potential interest in continuing a similar relationship. Paul Stronski 
argues that the Russian nuclear deal with Zuma was an attempt to rekindle these Cold War-
era ties.205 With the nuclear deal no longer an option, the Kremlin is forced to pursue other 
avenues of influence.  
2. Expertise 
Russian military expertise has roots in South Africa’s history. Many senior ANC 
members and current senior South African National Defense Force officers received 
military training from the Soviet Union during their struggle against apartheid.206 Despite 
these high-level ties, Russian activity in Africa and the Indian Ocean region decreased 
significantly following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Part of Russia’s Africa re-
engagement efforts involve rekindling some of the military-to-military ties between the 
Kremlin and its African partners. Recent events indicate that South Africa is among these 
African partners.  
In 2019, two Tupolev ‘Black Jack” bombers landed in Pretoria, coinciding with the 
inaugural Russia-Africa Summit in Sochi. The fortuitous timing of this event made many 
observers speculate that the incident signaled an increase in bilateral military engagement 
between the Russia and South Africa.207 In November 2019, a month after the landing of 
the bombers, South Africa, Russia, and China participated in Exercise Mosi, a trilateral 
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the countries.208 At a previous BRICS summit, President Vladimir Putin called for greater 
military integration among BRICS countries, leading many security experts to conclude 
that the increased military cooperation between Russia and South Africa was a 
manifestation of this statement.209 Beyond the landing of Russian bombers and a maritime 
training exercise, much remains to be seen in the military-to-military engagement between 
Russia and South Africa in terms of expertise.  
One potential instance of Russian expertise involves the state-owned Denel 
Aeronautics helicopter maintenance facility in Kempton Park. The facility is the only one 
of its kind in Africa that is certified to conduct maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) 
on Russian made helicopters.210 The facility routinely engages with Russian technicians 
for training and assistance. The facility opened in 2013 and in 2018 was the sole MRO 
facility for the nearly 700 Russian made helicopters in operation on the continent.211 
However, a single maintenance facility employing Russian technicians is hardly a source 
of geopolitical influence and South Africa’s history of ‘fierce neutrality’ that involves 
skepticism of any foreign military influence would likely prevent Russia gaining any 
influence involving the facility.212  
The nuclear sector, a comparative advantage for Russia, could have proven a useful 
vector to activate the expertise mechanism. The failure of the Russia-South Africa nuclear 
deal has, at present, made this an unlikely possibility. While speaking during the Russia-
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Africa Summit in 2019, President Ramaphosa assured President Putin of his country’s 
desire to expand its nuclear program, but such would occur at South Africa’s preferred, 
“timing, comfort, and cost.”213 The damage stemming from the controversial nuclear deal 
is difficult to overstate and might expose limits of Russian influence in other mechanisms.  
3. Attraction and Legitimacy 
In terms of attraction, President Zuma’s foreign policy approach could very well be 
explained with his own personal ties with Russia and a desire to become more integrated 
with his former anti-apartheid ally.214 The 2009 financial crisis, brought Zuma to prioritize 
closer ties his country maintains towards the BRIC group of Brazil, Russia, India, and 
China, which Moscow touted as an alternative to the G-7.215 As mentioned earlier, Zuma’s 
foreign policy adopted a more critical stance against European and U.S. actions in Libya, 
claiming both went beyond their UN Security Council mandate. And on the question of 
Ukrainian sovereignty, in 2014, South Africa abstained from the UN General Assembly 
vote, arguably a departure from previous administrations ‘non-interference’ policy.216 The 
instances of South Africa behaving, believing, and perceiving as Russia does, aligns well 
with French and Raven’s attraction concept.217 The degree to which this remains an 
element of South Africa’s foreign policy; however, remains disputable.  
Although Cyril Ramaphosa, to a large extent, maintains Zuma’s prickly foreign 
policy towards the West, his approach towards Russia is more subtle than his predecessor. 
In an interview following the first Russia-Africa Summit in 2019, Cyril Ramaphosa spoke 
of his appreciation for Putin’s view towards African nations saying he found Putin’s 
perception, “very mature.”218 Rather than speaking of Russia as a country that South 
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Africa wishes to align with, Ramaphosa spoke of Russia as an equal, whose approach 
towards African nations, based on mutual respect and mutual recognition, has the potential 
to build fruitful relations between Africa and Russia.219 In keeping with this spirit of being 
treated as equals, Ramphosa suggested the next Russia-Africa Summit take place in Africa, 
rather than having nearly 47 heads of state travel to Russia, which Putin accepted.220 A 
lack of meaningful deliverables characterized this summit in Sochi and some speculate that 
the current Russia-South Africa relationship is still marking time due to the ongoing fallout 
from South Africa’s previous administration.221 
In terms of legitimacy, from the ANC’s anti-apartheid struggle to when South 
Africa joined BRICS, it appears South Africa’s political leaders view Moscow as a 
legitimate authority figure. On the international stage, Jacob Zuma’s closing ranks with his 
fellow BRICS nations and South Africa’s voting record on Ukrainian sovereignty, 
demonstrate clear instances of South Africa aligning itself with Russia’s preferred 
behavior. President Zuma has probably viewed friendly relations with the Kremlin at a 
higher priority than previous South African presidents. However, the controversial nuclear 
deal effectively reset Russia-South Africa relations, potentially requiring a cooling off 
period before President Ramaphosa could bring relations to the same level as they were 
before Zuma’s resignation. With Zuma currently battling the South African judicial system, 
it appears this chapter in Russia-South Africa relations has not yet run its course and 
remains fresh in South Africa’s political memory. Taking a cautious approach towards his 
relations with President Putin is probably President Ramaphosa’s most likely course of 
action, given the level of sensitivity South Africa’s civil and political society holds towards 
the previous administration’s corruption charges, which involved the Kremlin to a large 
extent. Andrew Weiss and Eugene Rumer, simplify these implications saying, “the 
controversy arising from the $76 billion nuclear deal triggered strong pushback and legal 
challenges from South Africa’s institutional checks and balances, civil society groups, and 
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independent media.”222 Thus, the Kremlin faces an uphill battle in gaining influence 
through the attraction and legitimacy mechanisms.  
4. Recognition 
In its effort to re-engage with South Africa, as part of Russia’s larger re-engagement 
strategy with African countries, instances of recognition have emerged. The Zuma 
administration witnessed instances of Russia identifying South Africa in a favorable way. 
Russia encouraged South Africa’s ascension into the BRICS group and advocated for its 
seat as a rotating member on the UNSC.223 The Russian bombers landing in South Africa 
and the naval Exercise Morsi, also serve as indication that the Kremlin views South Africa 
as an important security cooperation partner. Although President Ramaphosa described the 
landing of the two ‘Blackjack’ bombers as being fortuitous, it remains difficult to image 
such a rare event occurring just before the first Russia-Africa Summit as mere 
coincidence.224 Many around the world saw these instances of military-to-military 
engagements as indication of strengthening cooperation between the two countries; 
however, Ramaphosa described the incidents as a symptom of the two countries ongoing 
military relationship.225 Whether the incident was Russia recognizing South Africa as an 
important military partner or mere coincidence resulting from an already established 
military-to-military engagement, appears dependent on the audience. Ramaphosa’s 
downplaying these invents, might reflect his own strategy of avoiding political backlash 
from the 44 percent of South Africans who harbor negative views towards Russia.226 
Given the diplomatic backlash from the failed nuclear deal, the Kremlin may continue to 
leverage the recognition mechanism to regain South African confidence towards the 
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Kremlin. Currently, the level of influence the Kremlin gains through recognition remains 
limited.  
F. CONCLUSION 
In summary, South Africa’s political landscape has limited foreign influence. 
Chinese infrastructure projects effectively stalled in South Africa’s legal system, which 
scrutinizes foreign business practices within its borders, a likely artifact of the Zuma 
presidency, and instances of corruption at the highest levels in South Africa’s government. 
Attempting to distance himself from the previous administration’s corruption, President 
Ramaphosa has cautiously approached his engagement with the Kremlin. Despite this 
limitation, Russia and South Africa exhibit a desire to further their bi-lateral military 
engagement, witnessed in a recent maritime security cooperation exercise and the landing 
of Russian strategic bombers on South African soil.  
The party-to-party engagement between the ANC and CCP was of particular 
interest of this research. This relationship exhibited an ability to foster personal 
relationships between high-ranking Chinese and South African officials. Naturally, this 
research found that such a relationship garners potential for Chinese influence. Again, the 
limiting factor to this potential influence, resides within South Africa’s political landscape, 
which remains particularly sensitive to potential foreign influence in domestic decisions 
and potential instances of high-level corruption 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
This research attempted to address how and to what extent Chinese and Russian 
activities succeed in advancing their influence in Kenya and South Africa. It applied 
established frameworks for assessing international influence that examines a state’s use of 
its power resources to activate power mechanisms. Although not an exhaustive analysis, 
this research identified relevant findings and points to important areas for future research 
and implications for U.S. foreign policy. This chapter will provide a summary of this 
analysis, first through a comparative analysis of Chinese and Russian influence. Then, this 
chapter will identify recommended future research. Lastly, this chapter will provide 
implications for U.S. influence and policy in Africa.  
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS: CHINESE INFLUENCE 
Unsurprisingly, this research identified extensive Chinese power resources 
mobilized in Kenya and South Africa. In the case of Kenya, China’s massive infrastructure 
development projects and increasingly strong economic ties with Nairobi, comprised the 
main focus of this research. On the surface, these activities appeared to bring 
unquestionable influence to Beijing, especially when considering the importance such 
activities served Uhuru Kenyatta’s economic development priorities. The implication 
behind China’s mobilization in Kenya is it places Beijing in a position to reward or coerce 
Kenyan behavior, make Kenya dependent on Chinese expertise, and attract Kenya’s 
integration into China’s economic circle.  
Despite the magnitude of Chinese power resources, this research argues Chinese 
ambitions and their potential for influence face significant challenges in Kenya. Kenya’s 
courts and politically conscious civil society demonstrated an ability to influence Kenya-
China relations. First, when Kenya’s Supreme Court ruled that the Mombasa-Nairobi SGR 
project was unconstitutional, due to violating Kenyan tendering laws, it signaled to 
President Kenyatta the need to work within Kenya’s legal framework. Second, when 
Kenya’s Parliament blocked an executive order to merge state-owned enterprises, an action 
many Parliament Members saw as advantageous to Chinese construction firms, it checked 
executive overreach into legislative prerogatives. Lastly, community-based organizations 
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such as the Save Lamu project and Kenya’s private construction firms, applied pressure on 
the Kenyan government and its dealings with Chinese state-owned businesses. In some 
cases, as in Lamu, civil society groups succeeded in blocking future construction projects. 
And, in the case of private construction firms, both China and Kenya adopted a more 
equitable approach towards employing local contractors, procuring local materials, and 
training Kenya workers to replace Chinese workers in managerial positions. These findings 
underscored the limits of Chinese influence on Kenya’s institutional decision making. 
This research found domestic political environments impacted Chinese influence 
in South Africa as well. Chinese power resources could play an integral role in South 
Africa’s economic development and infrastructure modernization. And like Kenya, South 
Africa’s current president has prioritized relations with Beijing, seeing China’s power 
resources as an integral element to his development strategy. Despite the importance 
Chinese power resources carry for South Africa’s economic development, South Africa’s 
political landscape has slowed ambitions established by Beijing and South African 
administrations. Specifically, South African courts are working to ensure China-South 
Africa relations do not violate South African law. This effectively stalled Chinese 
infrastructure projects in South Africa. 
In short, this research found extensive mobilization of Chinese power resources in 
Kenya and South Africa. With these power resources came potential for Chinese influence 
in terms of reward, coercion, expertise, and attraction. Elements characteristic of a 
democratic society—rule of law and civil society—proved to be the principal factor 
towards limiting Chinese influence. Across the two countries, respect for the rule of law, 
institutional checks on power, and a politically conscious civil society, impeded the 
ambitions of both Beijing and the chief executives of Kenya and South Africa 
B. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS: RUSSIAN INFLUENCE 
Whereas China mobilizes massive power resources and attracts potential avenues 
of influence, Russia is more limited in terms of both power resources and influence 
potential. The Russian Federation does not possess the economic or ideological relevance 
of its predecessor, the Soviet Union, and any foreign policy attempting to leverage gains 
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achieved in the Soviet era are becoming increasingly irrelevant. These limitations are due 
in part to Russia’s recent re-engagement with Africa, which only meaningfully resumed 
two decades after the fall of the Soviet Union, and, unlike China, lacks the massive power 
resources to accelerate relations. 
In Kenya, Russia is only beginning to build a relationship with Nairobi. Kenya’s 
alignment with Western powers during the Cold-War and Russia’s retraction from Africa 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union left little, in terms of bilateral relations, for the 
Russian Federation to build upon. The Kremlin’s recent engagement with Nairobi, 
however, indicates both countries have an interest in increasing economic ties. Such 
rhetoric has yet to manifest itself in significant Russian activity. As a result, the Kremlin 
currently maintains little opportunities of influence in Kenya. Ultimately, this research 
determined Kenya-Russia relations are in the beginning stages of forging meaningful bi-
lateral relations.  
Russia has encountered less of a cold start in its re-engagement with South Africa. 
Having had established ties between the Kremlin and prominent South African political 
elites during the Soviet era, Russia appears well-positioned for a more seamless re-
engagement strategy; however, evidence suggests that an ill-fated Russian nuclear deal 
proved an example of Russian overreach into South Africa’s institutional decision making. 
Like the challenges faced by China, South Africa’s commitment to the rule of law, 
institutional checks, and politically conscious civil society, prevented the fulfillment of 
Russian plans with South Africa, leaving the current relationship at a standstill.  
The current Russian re-engagement strategy with Africa, a recent development of 
Putin’s foreign policy agenda, continues to take shape in Africa, showing few instances of 
Russia mobilization of power resources. It is doubtful Russia will achieve the level of 
geopolitical significance in Africa characteristic of the Soviet Union. Given Russia’s 
comparatively limited power resources, Russia’s re-engagement with Kenya and South 
Africa will likely remain low on Putin’s foreign policy agenda. Consequently, the 
opportunities for Russia to leverage the various power mechanisms to influence state 
behavior remain negligible in Kenya and South Africa.  
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C. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Admittedly, this research is not an exhaustive analysis of Chinese and Russian 
influence in Kenya and South Africa. Readers with an understanding of Russian and 
Chinese foreign policy characteristics would quickly identify other potential influence 
activities not mentioned in this research—China’s Confucius Institutes and Russian Private 
Military Companies for example. Even some of the elements discussed in this research 
would benefit from a deeper analysis. The CCP’s engagement with other foreign political 
parties is one such element. 
In the case of South Africa, this research identified a strong relationship between 
the CCP and ANC. This relationship took the form of political training for ANC cadre’s 
and routine engagement between the two political parties. Undoubtedly, these engagements 
provide the CCP with personal ties to South Africa’s political elites at high levels within 
the South African government. A deeper analysis of the extent of this relationship in South 
Africa, and other African countries, would provide a meaningful addition to the literature 
regarding Chinese influence. Given the extensive power resources mobilized by China, it 
seems the element of party-to-party engagement has proven largely overlooked in favor of 
more tangible elements of Chinese power resources.  
One element of Chinese power resources that continues to be the focus of the 
literature is the large-scale infrastructure projects and their associated financing from 
Beijing. Often, the narrative of ‘debt trap diplomacy’ emerges from these power resources, 
leading many to conclude that China provides loans with the knowledge of the recipient’s 
inability to service them. This assumes that, should recipients of Chinese loans fail in their 
repayment obligations, China would achieve leverage and influence over foreign 
governments. This depiction of Chinese foreign policy continues to propagate, despite 
limited evidence. The economic impacts of the COVID-19 virus adversely impacted many 
African counties, to include Kenya. Yet China has not seized infrastructure or acted in a 
way that would support a ‘debt trap diplomacy’ narrative. This does not suggest that 
Chinese large-scale infrastructure projects and their associated loans do not provide Beijing 
with avenues to influence state behavior. Instead, this research suggests that such influence 
is more nuanced than what other narratives imply. The literature would benefit from further 
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analysis into China’s approach towards debt restructuring and potential influence such 
seemingly benevolent behavior forwards Beijing. Ultimately, the ‘debt trap diplomacy’ 
narrative is a specious argument at best and potentially overlooks other avenues of 
influence achieved through Chinese loans.  
Concerning Russia, this research suggests that Russia maintains a limited capacity 
to mobilize power resources in Kenya and South Africa. However, this limitation should 
not discount the value of further research into Russia’s approach towards Kenya and South 
Africa. In both cases, Putin expressed interest towards enhancing his country’s ties with 
Kenya and South Africa. In Kenya, Russian rhetoric typically implies increasing economic 
ties. And in South Africa, Russian expertise might prove an avenue for future influence. In 
the latter case, Russia backed its rhetoric with action, such as the landing of Russian 
strategic bombers in South Africa and joint maritime exercises, indicating a growing 
security cooperation partnership between the two countries. And despite setbacks from a 
failed nuclear deal, both Russia and South Africa expressed interest in re-engaging each 
other on this issue. Simply put, future research would benefit the literature by providing a 
deeper analysis of the trajectory of Russian relations with Kenya and South Africa.  
Lastly, the political landscape of Kenya and South Africa was identified as the key 
impediment to Russian and Chinese influence. This assumes that political environments 
lacking characteristics such as an independent judiciary, politically conscious civil society, 
and free media are potentially more vulnerable to Chinese and Russian influence. Future 
research should investigate which types of domestic political conditions shape international 
influence and why.  
D. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Based on the central argument of this research, a key ingredient blunting Russian 
and Chinese influence lies in the political landscape of African nations. U.S. foreign policy 
would do well to assist in the strengthening of these political landscapes. Organizations 
such as the United States Agency for International Development or National Endowment 
for Democracy, focus on building democratic, accountable, and effective governments 
through institutional reform and technical assistance. They should also engage with civil 
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society groups and other political stakeholders to promote government responsiveness and 
accountability. Such organizations would likely prove the most beneficial towards U.S. 
foreign policy and improve the circumstances of its African partners, while neutralizing 
influence of U.S. competitors. Conversely, should societies backslide from democratic 
progress, this research suggests, they would then become increasingly vulnerable to U.S. 
competitor influence.  
Chinese and Russian interactions with Kenya and South Africa, discussed in this 
research, identify some important lessons for U.S. foreign policy, especially when 
considering the NSS and NDS. Both documents recognize the strategic value of Africa and 
the importance of competing with Russia and China in the region. The U.S. should 
cautiously approach its competition with Russia and China in Africa, while respecting the 
national interests of Kenya and South Africa. Neither country represents an open playing 
field in which international actors can simply get whatever they want. 
Both Kenya and South Africa possess societies very much aware of the implications 
of foreign influence. Instead of placing competition of Russian and China at the heart of 
U.S. sub-Saharan Africa policy, U.S. foreign policy would benefit by identifying the 
national interests of African governments, where they align with U.S. interests, and how 
elements of U.S. national power could assist in achieving these interests. Approaching 
foreign policy through the lens of ‘great power competition’ would likely fall short of 
achieving this and runs the risk of mobilization African societies against U.S. foreign 
policy.  
In the case of Kenya and South Africa, political leaders have plans and ambitions 
independent of external influence. Both, like elsewhere in Africa, are managing economies 
that struggle to modernize and keep pace with growing populations. Thus, economic 
development and modernization of their countries’ infrastructure hold a high priority 
towards addressing their domestic issues. Often, they turn to U.S. competitors for 
assistance in addressing these challenges. Looking at such behavior through the lens of 
‘great power competition’ oversimplifies a complex problem and ignores the strong 
incentives for agency by African governments. 
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The national interests of Kenya and South Africa do not revolve around a rhetoric 
of ‘great power competition’ or ‘a new scramble for Africa’. Such rhetoric negates the 
national interests of African countries and shifts the focus towards the rivalry between the 
U.S. and its competitors. Cooperation might provide an avenue to dial down an adversarial 
focused great power competition narrative. Areas of cooperation exist in economic 
development, technological modernization, and security assistance. U.S. foreign policy 
should take a more indirect approach towards competition and this research offers such an 
approach.  
In summary, U.S. foreign policy should approach its competition through the lens 
of African interests rather than ‘great power competition’. Undoubtedly, areas exist where 
U.S. foreign policy should confront Chinese and Russian interactions with African 
countries, predatorial and illegal business practices, but this should not dominate the core 
of U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. maintains several comparative advantages, and its 
competitors have demonstrated limitations to their own power resources. Leveraging U.S. 
comparative advantages, such as improving democratic institutions and supporting African 
interests in security and economic development, would prove more lasting and beneficial 
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